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CHAPTER ONE 
PREVIEW 
 
1 Introduction 
South Africa has a history of discrimination against the majority of its people.  
 
Before the advent of the New South Africa, women found themselves the most 
discriminated against, vulnerable and oppressed group in South African society and it 
was believed that the enactment of the successive Constitutions1 would pave the way for 
the recognition of different cultural, religious and Customary norms and practices.2  This 
research is involved with the area of cohabitation, and, also, seeks to establish the role 
successive legislatures and courts have played in the disparity between cohabitation and 
marriage.  It seemed obvious when the new Constitution was adopted in South Africa that 
all citizens’ rights were apparently protected.  It became clear, however, that this was not 
the case when, in view of developments elsewhere in the world, one takes cognisance of 
the discrimination against those women who cohabit. The reason why I originally 
undertook to conduct this research was to investigate the causes of the inequality between 
women who cohabit and women who are a party to a civil marriage.  The Constitution, it 
seemed, aimed to protect the rights, dignity and equality of all citizens. I did, therefore, 
decide to explore the role of the legislature and courts regarding the issue of inequality. 
 
 
My aim with this research is not to suggest that certain privileges should be taken away 
from married women, but that South African law should embrace the right to equality 
fully and provide the right to cohabit to all women.  I do not suggest rapid change, but 
that at least some development in the area of cohabitation should take place.  The law has 
indeed demonstrated substantial progress in terms of monogamous and polygynous 
Customary marriages,3 as well as monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages,4 but 
                                                 
1  Interim Constitution, 1993 and the Constitution, 1996. 
2  In this regard, the RCMA  (1998) followed upon the Constitution. 
3  RCMA, 1998.  
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despite this gradual development, discrimination is still prevalent against the female 
cohabitee.  Singh5 contends that South Africa opened itself to scrutiny when it accepted 
the CEDAW, and I believe that the country is compelled to develop its law in compliance 
with the principles of that Convention. Therefore, my ultimate goal is to explore ways 
and means to eliminate unfair discrimination in the field of marriage related partnerships. 
I submit that the Legislature must abolish legislation that contains discriminatory 
provisions, and am of the opinion that most of the South Africans are waiting in 
anticipation for the Legislature’s passing of the Draft Bill on Domestic Partnerships that 
was published on 14 January 2008.  
 
2  Overview of approach and chapters  
The myth, that when you lived with your partner for five years, you would be entitled to 
legal protection, has not been eradicated.  Such recognition would have resulted in 
children being treated as legitimate. Such children’s extra-marital status obviously 
disadvantages women that are already disadvantaged by, for example, being Black and 
living within patriarchal communities.   
 
The purpose of this research is to present a preliminary investigation of the influence of 
Common law on cohabitation prior to the enactment of the Constitution, and, thereafter, 
the influence of constitutional rights on family law.  Marriage, in South Africa, used to be 
seen as sacred, and the conception that it refers exclusively to the voluntary, 
monogamous union of one man and one woman, has to some extent become outdated, 
and is inequitable in a multi-cultural South African society. To me, it seems as if 
cohabitation has become a Cinderella subject, particularly after the Volks6 case, and it is 
now the right time for legislation to change the rules in order to recognise this alternative 
form of ‘marriage’.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
4  See Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) and Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 
2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC), dealt with infra. 
5  Singh  (1999)  at 315.   
6  Volks NO v Robinson and Others  2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
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In Chapter Two I explore the position of Muslim women.  A brief overview of the 
position of women prior to and after the advent of the Constitution, is given. This chapter 
also demonstrates, through case law, how the Common law has developed in order to 
improve the status of monogamous Muslim marriages, and to a certain extent polygynous 
Muslim marriages. Our courts are required to develop the Common law so as to ‘promote 
the spirit, purport and object of the Draft Bill of Rights’.7  Case law demonstrates why it 
is important for the courts not to ignore the outcry of oppressed women who are parties to  
de facto ‘marriages’. 
 
Chapter Three explains the status of African women in Customary law type of 
relationships prior to, and after, the advent of the Constitution.  Special reference is made 
to the fundamental contribution of the RCMA8. 
 
In Chapter Four, I explore the position of women in Common law type of relationships in 
terms of the Constitution, as well as other legislation, with special reference to the Volks9 
case. The majority judgment in the Volks10 case, indicates a marked contrast to the 
Constitutional Court’s approach in earlier cases, where rights and benefits were extended 
to people in monogamous and now polygynous Muslim marriages.11 In this research I 
question the reasons given by the Court in the Volks12 case for the applicant’s failure to 
prove her case, and I suggest that the Court should have assisted Mrs Robinson, and have 
provided for the protection of vulnerable heterosexual cohabitants.13 As Cooke14 has said, 
it important for me to determine whether Mrs Robinson’s misfortunes may cause one to 
ask whether this case was the most appropriate one to test the rights of heterosexual 
cohabitants. 
 
                                                 
7    Section 39 of the Constitution, 1996. 
8    RCMA, 1998. 
9   Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
10   Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
11  For example, Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC). 
12  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
13  Cooke (2005) at 542. 
14  Cooke (2005) at 556. 
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In Chapter Five, I explore the differences between the two ‘institutions’, namely, 
marriage and cohabitation, and argue that a piece of paper is the main cause of 
discrimination against a female cohabitee.  There is also the assumption that there is an 
inherent difference between cohabitation and a civil marriage. The courts, in general, 
based their views on ‘public policy’, but some authors are of the opinion that it is not 
‘public policy’, but rather ‘state policy’.  Dlamini,15 for instance, asserts that our courts 
occasionally equate civil marriages with Christianity. He further states that this 
comparison misleads the public, because it creates the impression that a civil marriage 
was established by Jesus Christ.  Yet, it is interesting to note that nowhere does Jesus 
state that marriages amongst His followers had to be monogamous or that a polygynous 
marriage was necessarily sinful.   
 
I also address the equality principle. Sloth-Nielsen16 asserts that the principle of equality, 
as well as the concern for the vulnerability of the marginalised groups in society, have 
contributed to the fact that the meaning of family, cohabitation and marriage has to be 
revisited.  In Mthembu v Letsela,17 for example, the Court failed to analyse the 
disadvantaged position of women who found themselves in the position of the applicant.   
 
The research will show that it is unnecessary to limit the question to ‘cohabitation vs 
monogamous marriage’, since the Constitution allows for equality, and both 
monogamous and polygynous marriages have been recognised by Parliament and courts, 
in respect of African and Islamic marriages.   
 
My aim is also to examine why courts are so reluctant to develop the Common law, 
because it seems as if they are unwilling to give effect to the authoritative constitutional 
command of gender equality, and to accommodate certain alternative marriage practices 
in South Africa.  
 
                                                 
15  Dlamini (1985) at 701-2. 
16  Sloth-Nielsen (2003) at 127. 
17  Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T). 
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Chapter Five also investigates the use of equality as both a right and a value.  It 
furthermore demonstrates the importance of expanding the role of equality to all cases in 
which groups suffering disadvantages are affected, including those in non-constitutional 
matters.  Equality as a value should also be utilised by our courts in order to allow 
substantive equality to form the transparent structure through which the application of the 
law takes place.  Throughout this chapter I urge the Legislature and courts to take 
cognisance of the right to equality, as well as to consider past unfair discrimination 
against women.  
 
Finally, this research covers very much the same time span as the period during which the 
‘fight’ for the recognition of same-sex relationships took place, culminating in the 
passing of the Civil Union Act18 - leaving the detail of ‘same-sex domestic partnerships’ 
still to be attended to by the legislature and courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18  Civil Union Act, 2006.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
POSITION OF WOMEN IN MUSLIM MARRIAGES 
 
1 Introduction 
Muslim marriages are potentially polygynous and for this reason are not generally 
recognised as valid in our law.19 
 
Muslim women who find themselves in a relationship may choose to marry in terms of 
the Marriage Act,20 or Muslim rites, or to cohabit. Certain statutory and case law 
recognise monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages for certain purposes. 
However, women who are not married under the Marriage Act21 or by Muslim rites, 
whether monogamous or polygynous, may be categorised as cohabitees.  Such 
cohabitees, currently, find no protection under our law until either the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill22 or the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill23 is passed.   
 
In South Africa we have a diverse society in which various communities, such as, 
Muslims, Jews, Hindus and Africans, live according to their own customs and usages. 
Currently, the law of South Africa generally recognises the validity of some of these 
customs and usages as law.24 Various judicial decisions have refused to recognise the 
validity of potentially polygynous Islamic marriages concluded in South Africa and 
abroad.25 Sinclair26 stated that Muslim marriages had been refused recognition as valid 
marriages in South African law because polygyny had been ‘reprobated by the majority 
of “civilized people”, on the ground of morality and religion’.27  
 
                                                 
19   Sinclair (1996) at 158. 
20   Marriage Act, 1961. 
21   Marriage Act, 1961. 
22   Draft Bill on Islamic Marriages (2003).   
23   Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
24   Rautenbach  (2003) at 168. 
25  See Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302. See also Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 
(A) where the Court came to the conclusion that the polygynous union between the parties must be 
regarded as void on the ground of public policy. According to these cases, Muslim marriages were contrary 
to public policy as a result of their potentially polygynous nature and, therefore, unenforceable.  
26   Sinclair (1996) at 164. 
27   Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 at 307. 
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This chapter will address how the position of Muslim women developed through case 
law.  
 
2. Brief overview of Muslim marriages prior to 1994 
Prior to the enactment of the interim Constitution, Muslim marriages were regarded as 
invalid at Common law on the ground that they were potentially polygynous and, 
therefore, offended public policy. Under colonialism and apartheid there was a refusal on 
the part of both the legislature and the courts to afford legal protection to parties in a 
Muslim marriage.  Historically, South Africa recognised only one type of family.  Only a 
husband and wife who married in terms of civil law had rights and obligations towards 
each other.28  There were two kinds of relationship to which the full range of family law 
was not extended despite the fact that they are common in South Africa, viz, African 
Customary marriages, that received some recognition for certain purposes, and religious 
Muslim marriages, that received no recognition. When parties ‘marry’ in terms of Islamic 
law with the intention that the principles of Islamic law should govern their relationship, 
they were not regarded as married according to South African law.   
 
Courts were adamant in their non-recognition of a marriage if it was a potentially 
polygynous one, whether or not it was recognised as valid in other countries.  Innes CJ 
adopted this principle in the Seedat’s Executors29 case where the learned Judge declined 
to recognise a potentially polygynous Muslim marriage. 
 
It becomes even more problematic when a party to a potentially polygynous marriage that 
has in fact been monogamous, is denied the protection of the law.  The circumstances of 
Ismail30 are in point here.  Trengrove J held that the ‘polygynous union between the two 
parties in the instant case must be regarded as void on the grounds of public policy’.31 
 
                                                 
28  See Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
29  Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302. 
30  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
31  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at 1025B. 
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The approach adopted by the Court is regrettable and Goldblatt32 correctly avers that the 
decision in the Ismail33 case remains, in South African law, as an example of the narrow 
Western bias approach that South Africa  adopted towards marriages that did not conform 
to the Christian or civil model.  
 
Muslim women cohabitees have no rights and duties, yet our courts, to a certain extent, 
came to the assistance of cohabitees by deciding that an express or implied universal 
partnership existed between the couple.  In the Ally34 case the Court gave recognition to a 
cohabitation that had lasted fifteen years, because the female cohabitee met the 
requirements for an implied universal partnership to exist, in that ‘the aim of the 
partnership was to make a profit; both parties contributed to the enterprise; the 
partnership operated for the benefit of both parties; and the contract between the parties 
was legitimate’.35 
 
With regard to the legal consequences for the Muslim cohabitee, the South African law 
contradicts itself by not recognising the Muslim cohabitee as a ‘spouse’ in terms of 
section 198 of the CPA, yet she is recognised as a ‘spouse’ in terms of subsection (13) of 
section 21 of the Insolvency Act.36   
 
3  Status and position of Muslim women after 1994: Constitution and protection 
afforded by legislation, case law and draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
In 1994 South Africa entered into a new constitutional dispensation with the 
commencement of the 1993 interim Constitution, which was repealed by the 1996 
Constitution.  South Africa’s post-apartheid case law provides important direction on the 
legal treatment of Muslim marriages and the right to freedom of religion. The pre-
democracy era stands in stark contrast to the subsequent jurisprudence emanating from 
the Courts.  
                                                 
32  Goldblatt (2000) at 141. 
33  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
34  Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) at 455. 
35 See also V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 (1) SA 612 (O) at 615B; Muhlmann v Muhlman 1981 (4) SA 
632 (W) at 634C, referred to in Ally supra. 
36  Insolvency Act, 1936. 
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In the post–apartheid era the constitutional validity of the Common law rule, enunciated 
in the Ismail37case, was challenged in the Ryland38 case. This case will be dealt with later 
in this section. The interim Constitution and the final Constitution highlight the 
distinction between Customary law and religious law.  Both Constitutions recognise the 
possibility that religious personal law and religious marriages may be recognised 
respectively.  However, I do not agree that Muslim Personal Law will continue to 
function independently, because case law has proven that our courts are prepared to 
constitutionalise Muslim marriages.39 
 
Sections 15(3)(a)(i) and 31(1) of the Constitution are incorporated in the Bill of Rights to 
protect the woman who marries in accordance with religion or in accordance with 
Customary law. Whereas section 15 encompasses protection of freedom of religion, 
section 31(1) provides protection of a right to religious practice in community with 
others.  Woolman40 asserts that both sections must be read together and that the inclusion 
of section 31 in the Constitution indicates a commitment to the maintenance of cultural 
pluralism.   
 
Other provisions in the Bill of Rights41 protect the cultural and religious diversity of 
South Africa, and it could be argued that the exercising of these rights include the right to 
be subject to one’s own personal legal system. Moosa42 argues that the interim 
Constitution did not bring much relief to the position of Muslim women because it failed 
to address the apparent conflict between the right to religious freedom and equality 
between sexes, which were equally provided for. However, it should be noted that certain 
case law reflects the impact of the Constitution on Muslim marriages, as well as how the 
position of married Muslim women has developed in a very dynamic way. 
 
                                                 
37  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
38  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) . 
39  Moosa (1998) at 202. See also Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC), Khan v 
Khan  2005 (2) SA 272 (T), and Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC). 
40 Woolman (2006) at 58-40.  
41 See, inter alia, sections 9, 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution, 1996. 
42  Moosa  (1998) at 201-202. 
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Potentially polygynous marriages were gradually recognised by South African law as can 
be observed from the discussions of the cases below.  
 
In the Rylands43 case Farlam J had to decide whether the Court should follow the 
decision in the Ismail44 case, and found that certain contracts flowing from a marital 
relationship which is potentially polygynous could be enforced.  However, the Court was 
not asked to recognise the marriage by Muslim rites as a valid marriage ‘but merely to 
enforce certain terms of a contract made between the parties which are in sense collateral 
thereto’.45  In arriving at this decision, the Court was satisfied that it was no longer bound 
by the decision in the Ismail46 case. In light of the decision of Farlam J, one must take 
cognisance of the fact that the Court had not decided that the Muslim marriage generated 
a legal duty to support a wife.47  It is submitted that Moosa’s view that issues, such as, 
reasonableness, need, and the ability to provide maintenance, underpin the duty to 
support,48 is the preferred one. I support Church’s49 view when she applauds the court in 
the Rylands50 case for having deviated from a ‘long line of decisions’ that had 
emphasised the monogamous notion of marriage, and the fact that the Court afforded 
recognition and enforced the consequences of a Muslim marriage. 
 
The Amod51 case afforded recognition to de facto monogamous Muslim marriages.  In 
this case, the Court had to decide whether the appellant’s right of support from the 
deceased, deserved recognition and protection from law.  The Court, in fact, afforded 
recognition on the ground that the Islamic marriage between the appellant and the 
deceased, was a de facto monogamous marriage, and concluded that the appellant had a 
cause of action.52 
 
                                                 
43  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) at 690. 
44  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
45  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) at 709F. 
46  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
47  Moosa and Karbanee (2004) at 281. 
48  Moosa and Karbanee (2004) at 282. 
49  Church (1997) at 292. 
50  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) . 
51  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
52  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA  at 1327G-H. 
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Bonthuys53 is of the opinion that this judgment did not provide relief for Muslim women 
who found themselves in a polygynous marriage, because the decision retained the 
traditional Common law bias in favour of monogamous family groups.  According to 
Rautenbach,54 the decision in Amod55 can be viewed as a landmark case regarding the 
rights of Muslim women in South Africa.  There is uncertainty whether the SCA would 
have made the same judgment had the marriage been a polygynous marriage.  
Goldblatt’s56 view confirms this concern when she stated that the judgment consciously 
left open the question of polygynous marriages or other religious marriages.  Mahomed 
CJ, who gave the judgment, stressed that the appellant was a party to a de facto 
monogamous marriage, and yet he was cautious to say that he left the issue of a 
polygynous Muslim marriage ‘entirely open’. 
 
The Amod57 decision is significant in that it improved the legal position of parties to 
Muslim marriages.  It achieved this by developing and altering the previous direction of 
the Common law. 
 
The Khan58 case challenged traditional and culturally bound notions of marriage within 
our law.  In this case, the Court found that it is not contra bonos mores to grant a Muslim 
wife maintenance in a polygynous marriage.59 The Khan60 case reflects the Court’s 
willingness to develop the Common law, not only in terms of the Maintenance Act,61 but 
also other statutes. 62 
                                                 
53  Bonthuys  (2002) at 763. 
54  Rautenbach and Du Plessis (2000) at 302. 
55  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
56  Goldblatt (2000) at 144. 
57  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
58  Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T). 
59  Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T) at 283A-B. 
60  Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T). 
61  Maintenance Act, 1998. 
62 Section 31 of the Special Pensions Act,1996 defines ‘dependant’ to include the spouse of a deceased to 
whom he or she was married ‘under any Asian religion’; Section 1 of the Demobilisation Act, 1996 defines 
‘dependant’ to include the surviving spouse to whom the deceased was married ‘in accordance with the 
tenets of a religion’; Section 1(2)(a) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 includes in the word 
‘marriage’ all marriages concluded according to the ‘tenets of any religion’; Section 21(13) of the 
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Another case of a Muslim woman who turned to the court for relief, was that of the 
Daniels63 case.  The applicant first approached the High Court in 199864 for a declaration 
that she was entitled to the house of Mr Daniels who had died intestate.  Steyn AJ 
dismissed the application on the basis of the non-recognition of the validity of the 
Muslim marriage between the deceased and Mrs Daniels.  
 
In 2000 Mrs Daniels approached the High Court65 for the second time, for an order 
declaring (i) that she was a spouse for the purposes of the ISA,66 and (ii) that she was a 
survivor for the purposes of section 2 of the MOSSA.67 It was a daunting task for 
counsel, for the applicant had to convince Van Heerden J that the word ‘spouse’ as used 
in the two Acts, should be interpreted to include spouses married in terms of Muslim 
rites.   
 
Although Van Heerden J applauded the judgments of Farlam J in the Rylands68 case and 
Mahomed CJ in the Amod69 case, she was adamant that the two judgments could not be 
interpreted as authority that Muslim marriages were valid in terms of South African law, 
nor that parties to such a union were to be regarded as ‘spouses’ when interpreting South 
African legislation.  The position adopted by the learned Judge does not fit in with the 
most basic principles of Chapter Two of the Bill of Rights, nor is her interpretation the 
only plausible one that can be accepted.70 
                                                                                                                                                 
Insolvency Act, 1936 describes the word ‘spouse’ to include a wife or husband  married ‘according to any 
law or custom’; and the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 defines that there is protection for ‘all people in a 
domestic relationship and include all people (whether they are of the same or of the opposite sex) who live 
or lived together in a relationship in the nature of marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to 
each other, or are not able to be married to each other’.   
63  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others  2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC). 
64  Daniels v Daniels and The Master  CPD 1998-05-1 Case No. 9787/98 (Unreported). 
65  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2003 (9) BCLR 969 (C). 
66  ISA, 1987 section 1. 
67  MOSSA, 1990. 
68 Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C). 
69 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
70 The Judge was in the position to rely on sections 9(3) and 15(3) of the Constitution, which stated that it 
could not be discriminated against fairly and unjustifiably on the grounds of, inter alia, religion and culture, 
and that the inclusion of Muslim wives and husbands within the meaning of the word ‘spouse’ in the two 
Acts, was a ‘probable’ interpretation. 
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In the Constitutional Court,71 Sachs J disagreed with Van Heerden J that the decisions of 
the two cases she relied on could ‘serve as authority for denying partners to Muslim 
marriages the protection offered by the Acts’.72 Sachs J, instead, agreed with the 
statement of Mahomed CJ in the Amod73 case, that the marriage between the appellant 
and the deceased was one of husband and wife.74 
 
The majority judgment decided that the word ‘spouse’ in both the ISA75 and the 
MOSSA76 could be interpreted so as to include a party to a monogamous Muslim 
marriage. This implies that, if so construed, they were not invalid and unconstitutional.77 
 
Although this decision may be seen as a landmark case regarding the rights of Muslim 
women under the South African law of intestate succession, its effect, until recently, was 
not to give recognition to polygynous Muslim marriages. The Hassam78 case, recently, 
recognised the concerns of the majority of South Africans with regard to the recognition 
of polygynous Muslim marriages.  The issue in this case was whether a surviving spouse 
in a polygynous marriage in terms of Muslim Personal Law, was entitled to the benefits 
stipulated in the ISA79 and the MOSSA80.   
 
In this case, Van Reenen J emphasised that the applicant’s polygynous marriage to the 
deceased, distinguished her matter from the Daniels81 case - in which case, the provisions 
of the two Acts, were interpreted to include a spouse in a de facto Muslim monogamous 
marriage within their ambit82. 
 
                                                 
71  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at 740. 
72  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at 749D. 
73  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
74  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at 748C. 
75  ISA, 1987. 
76  MOSSA, 1990. 
77  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at 750B-C. 
78  Hassam v Jacobs NO and others [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C). 
79  ISA, 1987. 
80  MOSSA, 1990. 
81  Supra. 
82  Hassam v Jacobs NO and others [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C) at paras 8 and 23. 
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 It was, therefore, held that the exclusion of spouses in polygynous Muslim marriages 
would not pass the test of constitutional scrutiny.  The Constitutional Court83 concurred 
with Van Reenen J that the exclusion of polygynous Muslim marriages from the 
protection of both the ISA84 and the MOSSA,85 was constitutionally invalid.86 
 
After their initial Report of 2000, the SALC followed it up with a Draft Bill on Muslim 
Marriages of 2003.   
 
It is evident that the Draft Bill will definitely effect changes to the position of Muslim 
women if and when it is passed.  The Draft Bill contains clauses relating to equality 
(clause 3); the status of marriages entered into before and after the commencement of the 
Act (clause 4); registration of Muslim marriages (clause 6); proprietary consequences 
(clause 8); dissolution of marriages (clause 9); and, among others, the legal requirement 
of the age eighteen years for Muslim marriages to be valid (clause 5).87  
 
This Draft Bill has been received with mixed feelings amongst Muslims. According to 
Motala,88 some Muslims oppose the draft Muslim Bill claiming that the Draft Bill 
amounts to State interference in matters of religion, while others claim that the mere fact 
that the Draft Bill is in the name of Islam, misrepresents the true nature of Islamic law.   
 
The question remains whether the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill will ever become law.  It 
has already been challenged in the Constitutional Court.89 According to the Mail & 
Guardian,90 the Constitutional Court had to make a decision as to whether the Court 
could compel Parliament or the President, to pass the Muslim Marriages Bill.  The Court 
questioned whether it had the power to tell Parliament or the President what to do in 
terms of law-making, and whether it should be the court of first instance in this regard. Is 
                                                 
83  Hassam v Jacobs  NO and Others 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC) at para 30. 
84  ISA, 1987. 
85  MOSSA, 1990. 
86  Hassam v Jacobs  NO and Others 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC) at para 39. 
87  Draft Muslim Marriages Bill (2003). 
88  Motala (2009) at 1. 
89  Maughan (2009) at 6. 
90  ‘Muslim Marriages law bid under the spotlight’ Mail & Guardian Online (2009) at 1.  
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Parliament not the law-maker? Why is the Court reluctant to tell Parliament to enact the 
Draft Bill? 
 
4  Conclusion 
The inclusion of marital status discrimination in the listed grounds of unfair 
discrimination in the equality rights of the Constitution, has created the expectation that 
domestic partnerships will be placed on a better footing within family law.91  
 
Although women remain the most vulnerable group in society, there has definitely been 
some a development in the status of the woman who marry in terms of Muslim rites. The 
research reflects clearly that there has been a dramatic change from the Common law 
perception of a marriage contracted according to Muslim rites, to the constitutional 
recognition of such a marriage.  This dramatic change is an indication that South Africa is 
ready for the passing of legislation that will recognise Muslim marriages. 
 
The consequences of non-recognition have been particularly unfair to women in general 
and Muslim women in particular.  It is likely that Muslim woman will find protection 
when Parliament passes either the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill,92 or at least the Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill,93 if the former remains in its current ‘deadlock’ position. 
 
However, considering all the conflicting comments towards the Draft Bill94 it is at this 
stage unpredictable whether Parliament will ever pass the Draft Bill95, or not. 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 prohibits discrimination 
on the ground of marital status and defines marital status to include: ‘the status or condition of being single, 
married, divorced, widowed or in a relationship, whether with a person of the same or the opposite sex, 
involving a commitment to reciprocal support in a relationship’. 
92 Draft Muslim Marriages Bill (2003). 
93 Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
94 Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
95 Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POSITION OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES  
 
1 Introduction 
The African woman, unlike the Muslim ‘spouse’, has the choice of entering into either a 
marriage in accordance with the law of the land, that is civil law, or statutory Customary 
law.   
 
A very important cultural practice in South Africa is lobolo. In order to form a Customary 
marriage in traditional African law, the man’s family would give cattle to the guardian of 
the prospective bride.  Today the bride wealth tends to be paid in cash by the prospective 
husband to the wife’s family.96  According to Sinclair97 the importance of the contract of 
lobolo in all tribal systems, even where it is not essential for the validity of the marriage, 
is that it serves to transfer the woman, and her reproductive capacity, from the family of 
her guardian to the family of her husband.98  Another one of the key principles of lobolo 
was to provide security for the woman when the marriage was to be terminated.   
 
Africans who marry almost invariably conclude a lobolo agreement in respect of their 
marriage, be it in terms of the RCMA99 or the Marriage Act.100  
 
Sinclair101 avers that as Customary marriages are potentially polygynous, African 
Customary family law is not a system adhered to by persons professing a certain religion.  
In Customary Law a man can have more than one wife.  As Customary law recognises a 
system of polygyny, a wife may not object if her husband wishes to conclude a second or 
further marriage.  
 
 
                                                 
96   Bronstein (1998) at 391; See also Sinclair (1996) at 242. 
97   Sinclair (1996) at 170-1. 
98   Sinclair  (1996) at 243. 
99   RCMA, 1998. 
100 Marriage Act, 1961. 
101 Sinclair (1996) at 158. 
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Bennett102 asserts that when the British occupied the Cape, Customary law was dismissed 
as a barbarous and pre-legal ‘custom’.  In the mid-nineteenth century, Customary law 
attained grudging recognition in Natal, Transvaal and Transkei as ‘Native law’, and in the 
twentieth-century it was rechristened ‘Bantu law’ by the architects of the apartheid 
regime.  According to Bonthuys,103 despite the fact that Customary marriages were not 
fully recognised in our law in the past, they were afforded limited recognition for certain 
purposes. The women in these marriages were not in the same position as cohabitees, as 
they found themselves in a better position.  Lesser legal consequences were afforded to 
cohabitees in comparison to those women who entered into a Customary marriage. 
Before November 2000 Customary marriages were recognised by some South African 
statutory laws, such as the Transkei Marriage Act104 and the KwaZulu-Natal Codes of 
Zulu law.105 The Transkei Marriage Act106  afforded full recognition to Customary 
marriages.  In terms of it, men were allowed to be party to more than one marriage 
simultaneously, irrespective of whether one of the marriages was a civil marriage out of 
community of property - but not in community of property.   
 
2  Brief overview of Customary marriages prior to 1994 
Until the advent of the interim Constitution in 1993, Customary law had not been 
recognised as a basic component of the South African legal system.107  Section 35 of the 
BAA108 defined a Customary ‘union’ as ‘the association of a man and a woman in a 
conjugal relationship according to Black law and custom, whether neither man nor 
woman is party to a subsisting marriage’. Although Customary marriages were not 
recognised in civil law because of their potentially polygynous nature, they were given 
limited recognition for particular purposes.  When a husband who married in accordance 
with Customary law died, his estate would devolve in accordance with the principles of 
                                                 
102 Bennett (1994) at 122. 
103 Bonthuys  and Pieterse  (2000) at 617. 
104 Transkei Marriage Act, 1978. 
105 See, e.g. KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu law, 1985. 
106 Section 3(1) of the Transkei Marriage Act, 1978. 
107 Bennett (2004) at 34. 
108 BAA, 1927. 
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Customary law.  Even where he left a will, certain assets would, nevertheless, devolve in 
accordance with Customary law.109  
 
Widows of Customary marriages were given statutory claims for loss of support in cases 
where the deaths of their breadwinners were caused either intentionally or negligently.110   
 
A man who contracted a civil marriage while a Customary marriage subsisted, did not 
commit bigamy; neither could the subsistence of a Customary marriage be regarded as an 
impediment to a civil marriage.111   
 
This was particularly problematic to Customary law wives whose husbands concluded 
civil marriages with other women during the subsistence of the former’s marriages.  Such 
Customary marriages were regarded as automatically dissolved by such later Civil 
marriages.  The KwaZulu Code of Zulu Law112 was the first to improve the position of 
women, in that irrespective of which marriage was entered into first (whether Customary 
or civil), the first marriage was recognised.  Since 1988 the existence of such a 
Customary marriage had acted as a barrier to a subsequent civil law marriage by the 
husband to another woman in the rest of South Africa, excluding the Homelands, and in 
1998 the RCMA113 extended this rule to the whole of South Africa. 
 
The status of the woman, prior to the passing of the RCMA,114 was equal to that of a 
minor.  In terms of section 11(3)(b) of the BAA,115 the Customary law wife who lived 
with her husband, was regarded as a minor for the purposes of contractual capacity and 
locus standi in judicio.  Their husbands were regarded as their guardians.  The wife’s 
status was not merely reduced to that of a Common law minor, but was reduced to that of 
a Customary law minor, which had particularly subordinating effects.116   
                                                 
109  Section 23 of the BAA, 1927. 
110  Section 31 (1) of the Black Laws Amendment Act, 1963. 
111  Hahlo (1985) at 33. 
112  KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu law, 1985. 
113  RCMA, 1998. 
114  RCMA, 1998. 
115  BAA, 1927. 
116  Robinson (1995)  at 461. 
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This statute effectively prevented women, who fell within its provisions, from owning 
property.  So too, the inability of African women to obtain credit which was linked to 
their lack of property rights.  Moreover, wives had limited contractual capacity, and their 
ability to sue in court was also restricted. Wives had no authority to terminate their 
marriage. It could only be terminated at the behest of the husband or the wife’s guardian 
acting on her behalf.117 
 
3  Status and position of African women after 1994:  Constitution and protection 
afforded by legislation and case law 
Before the dawn of South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation, South African 
Customary law existed separately from the Common law and enjoyed a significantly 
lesser status.  The new constitutional dispensation began not only a political, but also a 
legal revolution.  For the first time in South Africa’s legal history Customary law became 
an issue of constitutional importance. Calls for increased recognition of Customary law in 
the new order, resulted in the Constitution recognising such law, and mandating the 
application thereof, while subjecting it to the same levels of constitutional scrutiny as  
Common law.118  
 
As said at the beginning, South Africa has a history of discrimination against the majority 
of its people.  This changed as from 1994, particularly when the Constitution119 became 
the supreme law of the country.  The Constitution aims to protect the rights, dignity and 
equality of all citizens.  Section 7 states ‘The Draft Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom’.120 
 
 
 
                                                 
117  Section 22 of the BAA, 1927. 
118  Section 211(3); the other relevant section is section 39(2). See also sections 33 (2); 33 (3); 35 (3) and 
       181 (2) of the interim Constitution, 1993. 
119  Constitution, 1996. 
120 Section 1. See also the statement of Cameron E in the ‘Sunday Times’ 4 Jan 2009 at 2 that ‘the 
Constitution is the bedrock of our democracy and that the Court is the guardian of the Constitution’. 
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The interim Constitution of 1993 came into force against the backdrop of several 
centuries of ethnic and race-based autocratic rule, which lacked democratic 
accountability, constitutionalism and a right to culture.121 The Constitution protects 
cultural rights and the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities.122  Section 
211 also protects those institutions that are unique to Customary law.  
 
Following upon the Constitution, another piece of legislation, the RCMA123 contributed 
substantially to the improvement of the position of African women who entered into  
Customary marriages. In the past marriages under Customary law had not been 
recognised by the state as full marriages and were called ‘Customary unions’ to 
distinguish them from full marriages.   
 
However, the RCMA bestowed recognition on such marriages ‘for all purposes’124.  This 
Act brought an end to the inferior status of the marriage entered into under Customary 
law. The Act does not only specify the important requirements for a valid Customary 
marriage, but also governs the registration of such marriages, its consequences, and 
termination. 
 
The Act addresses the insulting history of non-recognition of Customary marriages in 
South Africa and gives expression to a number of legislative objectives.125  Bronstein126 
adds that the Act purports to recognise and value, traditional African culture, and is 
concerned with regularising Customary marriages within the context of a state 
bureaucratic system. In addition, the Act also addresses women’s rights under Customary 
law.127 African women have the choice to marry either in terms of civil law or Customary 
law.   
 
                                                 
121  Basson (1995) at v.   
122  Sections 30, 38 and 31 of the Constitution, 1996. 
123  RCMA, 1998. 
124  Section 2 RCMA, 1998. 
125  Bronstein (2000) at 558. 
126  Bronstein (2000) at 558. 
127  Bronstein (2000) at 558. 
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The RCMA128 represents a major initiative by the new Government in combining 
Customary and Common law principles and rules in conjunction with the Constitution, 
according to my supervisor, Professor F.A. de Villiers.   
 
The next important development, was the Bhe129 case, denoting the supremacy of the 
Constitution.  The constitutionality of sections 23(10) (a), (c) and (e) of the BAA,130; 
regulation 2 (e) of the Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of Estates of 
Deceased Blacks,131 and section 1(4)(b) of the ISA,132 were challenged in the High Court.  
Intestate succession under Customary law was based on the principles of male 
primogeniture.  The issue in this case was whether a female African person, whose 
parents’ marriage according to African law custom, could not be proved to the 
satisfaction of the Court, is entitled to inherit in terms of intestate succession.  The High 
Court, per Ngwenya J, emphasised concern with the attitude of our courts towards 
African Customary law.  The Judge concluded that the only reason why the applicants 
could not inherit was because they were female and Black, and that this system 
constituted discrimination on the grounds of race and gender.133  The Court consequently 
held that the discrimination offended sections 9(1) and (3) of the Constitution,134 and that 
such law135 was unconstitutional and invalid.136   
 
The Constitutional Court137 agreed that section 23(10) of the BAA138 was a racist 
provision which was fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution.  Langa DCJ 
applauded the judgment Sachs J, for the majority, in the Moseneke139 case.  Sachs had 
said that ‘no society based on equality, freedom and dignity would tolerate differential 
                                                 
128  RCMA, 1998. 
129  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C). 
130  BAA, 1927. 
131  Published in Government Gazette 10601 dated 6 February 1987. 
132  ISA, 1987. 
133  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C) at para 36. 
134  Constitution, 1996. 
135 Sections 2 (10)(a), (c) and (e) of BAA; as well as regulation 2(e) of the Regulations of the 
Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks; and section 1(4)(b) of  ISA,1987. 
136  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C) at para 36. 
137  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR (1) (CC). 
138  BAA, 1927. 
139  Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC) at para 23. 
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treatment based on skin colour, particularly where the legislative provisions in question 
formed part of a broader package of racially discriminatory legislation that systematically 
disadvantaged Africans.140 
 
Langa DCJ concluded that, in the light of its history and context, it was evident that 
section 23 of BAA141 and its regulations, were discriminatory and violated section 9(3) of 
the Constitution.142 
 
This judgment paved the way for all African women in similar circumstances as the 
applicants in the Bhe case to inherit from their spouses in terms of the ISA.143  Parliament  
has just confirmed this when it passed the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act.144   
 
Two Transkeian cases should also be referred to, before ending this section. In the 
Prior145 case the Court held that the provisions of section 37146 of the Transkei Marriage 
Act,147 as well as the Common law rule with regard to the husband’s marital power over 
his wife, were inconsistent with the interim Constitution.  In the Makholiso148 case, the 
Common law concept of a ‘putative marriage’ was extended to the realm of Customary 
marriages. 
The above cases illustrate how the Constitution and the RCMA together developed the 
Common law.  I will now proceed to discuss the important sections of this Act. 
 
4  Fundamental contribution of RCMA 
                                                 
140  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR (1) (CC) at para 65. 
141  BAA, 1927. 
142  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR (1) (CC) at para 68. 
143  ISA, 1987. 
144  Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2009. 
145  Prior v Battle and Others 1999 (2) SA 850 (Tk). 
146 This section provides that a woman married in terms of the Act in a civil marriage be under her 
husband’s guardianship for the duration of the marriage. 
147  Transkei Marriage Act, 1978. 
148  Makholiso v Makholiso 1997 (4) SA 509 (Tk). 
 
 
 
 
 30
An important contribution of the Act is that it protects and sustains cultural rights in 
various ways, for example, fully recognizes Customary marriages, retains polygyny and 
endorses a living version of Customary law.149 
 
Section 2 determines that all valid Customary marriages entered into before or after the 
commencement of the Act, will be recognised as marriages for all purposes.150  If a man 
had more than one valid Customary marriage, then all of his marriages will be fully 
recognised.151 Very often, however, one has to prove to the court that a valid Customary 
marriage existed between the two parties.  An example of such an instance, was the issue 
in the Mabena152 case. The respondent claimed that she was married to the deceased in 
terms of Customary law, and the magistrate upheld this contention.  On appeal, the 
appellant averred that the respondent’s mother had negotiated the lobolo with the 
deceased, which was contrary to the rules of Customary law. However, expert witness 
Labuschagne153 took a different view on the same issue in terms of ‘living Customary 
law’: 
 
‘Dit gebeur in praktyk reeds dat die vrou self die lobolo aan haar man terugbetaal as sy 
nie met die huwelik wil voortgaan nie.  Dit gebeur soms dat die man sy vrou en kinders 
vir n lang tydperk verlaat.  In sodanige omstandighede ontvang die vrou soms haar dogter 
se lobolo om haarself en die kinders te onderhou’. 
 
The Court held that a valid Customary marriage existed between the respondent and the 
deceased.    
 
Section 4 determines the registration of Customary marriages.  When a marriage is 
registered the parties are issued with a certificate which serves as proof that a valid 
Customary marriage existed.  However, in terms of section 4(9) of the Act, failure to 
register a Customary marriage does not affect the validity of the marriage. In the 
                                                 
149  Bronstein (2000) at 558. 
150  Sections 2(1) and 2(2).  
151  Sections 2(3) and 2(4).  
152  Mabena v Letsoala 1997 (2) SA 1068 (T). 
153  Labuschagne (1991) at 551. 
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Baadjies154 case the applicant failed to produce any certificate of registration of a 
Customary marriage.  Francis AJ, after considering all the evidence, held that no 
Customary marriage had existed between the applicant and the respondent.   
 
In the Sokhewu155 case the provisions of section 4 of the Act were to the advantage of the 
plaintiff.  This case has striking similarities to the Ismail156 case.   
 
The issue was that the marriage was invalid because it was not registered in terms of 
section 4 of the RCMA.  Jafta AJP had to consider whether the Court would rely on the 
decision of Kruger AJ in the Kwitshane157 case that the failure to register a marriage 
within a reasonable time resulted in the marriage either falling away completely, or 
remaining invalid until it had been registered. In the present case, the learned Judge 
considered the plaintiff’s illiteracy and ignorance regarding the Transkei Marriage Act158 
which required the registration of Customary marriages. 
 
In conclusion, the learned Judge was satisfied that the Court in the Kwitshane159 case had 
erred in concluding that Customary marriages could not be regarded as valid marriages 
unless they were registered.160  
 
 However, in the Wormald161 case Maya AJA, writing for the majority, declined to deal 
with the application for a declaratory order concerning the validity of the Customary 
marriage. The majority concluded that there were conflicting decisions in the Transkei 
Division as to whether registration under the Transkei Marriage Act was a prerequisite to 
the validity of a Customary marriage:162 
                                                 
154  Baadjies v Matubela 2001 (3) SA 427 (W). 
155  Sokhewu and Another v Minister of Police 2002 JOL 9424 (Tk). 
156  Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
157  Kwitshane v Magalela 1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk). 
158  Transkei Marriage Act, 1978. 
159  Kwitshane v Magalela 1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk). 
160  Sokhewu and Another v Minister of Police 2002 JOL 9424 (Tk) at 16. 
161  Wormald v Kambule  2006 (3) SA 562 (SCA). 
162  Wormald NO and Others v Kambule  2006 (3) SA 562 (SCA)   at 572J – 573A-B. 
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‘The one is Kwitshane v Magalela and Another 1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk) and the other 
judgment of Jafta AJP in Shwalakhe Sokhewu and Another v Minister of Police 
(Unreported – Transkei Division Case No 293/94).  In the former case it was held that 
registration was essential to a valid Customary marriage, whereas the latter decided the 
contrary.  The court a quo considered both judgments and concluded that Kwitshane had 
been wrongly decided and that the Sokhewu judgment was correct and should be 
followed’.163 
 
In the Kambula164 case the Court was confronted with two issues, namely whether the 
failure to register the alleged Customary marriage made it invalid, and whether the 
applicant was a survivor in terms of the provisions of the MOSSA.165  Pickering J made 
reference to the decisions in the Kwitshane166 case, the Sokhewu167 case and the minority 
judgment of Combrink AJA in the Wormald168 case. After much consideration Pickering 
J held that if parties had failed to register their Customary marriage in terms of the 
Transkei Marriage Act169, their failure to register the marriage would not affect its 
validity.170 
 
Section 6 of the RCMA171brought about drastic changes.  African women were freed 
from the guardianship and marital power of their husbands.  Women are now legally 
autonomous and no longer the perpetual wards of their husbands.  As a consequence of 
the Act, the legal status of African women improved in that they now have full 
contractual capacity, the right to own property and acquire credit, and ‘locus standi’. 
 
Section 6 was applied in the Seemela172 case. The respondent averred that the appellant, 
an African woman, had no legal capacity to bring a civil damages claim in the 
                                                 
163  Wormald NO and Others v Kambule  2006 (3) SA 562 (SCA) at 572J – 573A-B. 
164  Kambule v The Master and Others 2007 (3) SA 403 (E). 
165  MOSSA, 1990. 
166  Kwitshane v Magalela  1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk). 
167  Sokhewu and  another v Minister of Police (2002) JOL 9424 (Tk). 
168  Wormald NO and Others v Kambule  2006 (3) SA 562 (SCA). 
169  Transkei Marriage Act, 1978. 
170  Kambule v The Master and Others 2007 (3) SA 403 (E) at 413B-C. 
171  RCMA, 1998. 
172  Seemela v Minister of Safety and Security [1998] 1 All SA 408 (W). 
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Magistrates Court. The Court held that the appellant had legal capacity to institute 
proceedings.  
 
Section 7 deals with the proprietary consequences of Customary marriages.  The 
constitutionality of section 7 was challenged in the Gumede173 case. Moseneke DCJ gave 
recognition to the purpose of the RCMA174 to the extent that it was enacted in terms of 
section 15(3) of the Constitution. However, the Court was still of the opinion that 
sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the RCMA175 were clearly discriminatory on one of the listed 
grounds, namely, gender.  The reason for this averment was that women in Customary 
marriages concluded before 15 November 2000 were subjected to unequal proprietary 
consequences176 - causing the Court to declare these sections to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution.177  
 
This judgment was applauded from all angles and once again proved that the courts had 
to interpret Customary law in line with the Constitution. 
 
5  Conclusion 
It is evident that the position of the African woman has improved since the enactment of 
the Constitutions (interim and final).  When the RCMA came into operation, the woman 
who was a partner to such a marriage, was no longer regarded as a cohabitee.  But 
although the RCMA178 brought relief to the position of the African woman, it did not 
bring relief to those still regarded as cohabitees. The African woman has the choice to 
conclude a civil marriage,179 or a Customary marriage,180 enjoying the protection of the 
law in both cases, or may cohabit with no protection at all. 
                                                 
173  Gumede v The President of South Africa 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC). 
174  RCMA, 1998. 
175  RCMA, 1998. 
176  Gumede v The President of South Africa 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) at para 34. 
177  Gumede v The President of South Africa 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) at para 45. 
178  RCMA, 1998. 
179  In terms of the Marriage Act, 1961. 
180  In terms of  the RCMA, 1998. 
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Development has taken place gradually in favour of African women after the enactment 
of the Constitution and RCMA,181 as well as recent case law. South Africans are now 
subject to a ‘uniform code of marriage law’. The latter affords legal recognition to 
Customary marriages next to civil marriages. This legislation is also entrenched in the 
Constitution182 which permits legislation to recognise marriages that are contracted under 
any tradition or system of religious, personal or family law, with the provision that such 
legislation must be consistent with the Constitution.183 
 
 Langa DCJ correctly, it is submitted, stated in the Bhe case184 that the Constitution 
envisaged a place for Customary law in our legal system and, more importantly, that 
some provisions of the Constitution necessitate that Customary law should be 
accommodated and not simply tolerated as part of South African law and that it is not 
immune from being declared unconstitutional if found to be inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
The Act was enacted to recognise the rights of women to practise their customs and 
culture. It was also enacted to ensure that women in Customary marriages were afforded 
an adequate share upon the dissolution of the marriage. 
 
The main object of the RCMA is to extend full legal recognition to marriages entered into 
in accordance with Customary law.  The Act also engenders a new respect for the African 
legal tradition, and, furthermore, also elevates the status of women and children by 
improving their position.  It will also provide certainty by identifying the rights and 
duties of spouses in contracting a marital union in accordance with Customary law.   
 
Bronstein185 is impressed with the drafters of the RCMA186, and so am I.  She asserts that 
the Act advanced the status of South African women.  Section 6 is just as important as 
                                                 
181  RCMA, 1998. 
182  Section 15(3) of the Constitution, 1996. 
183  O’Sullivan  and Murray (2005)  at 17. 
184  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 
para 39. 
185  Bronstein  (2000) at 574. 
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section 2, because the former put an end to the perpetual minority status of women under 
Customary law.  This implies that equality between spouses has been entrenched, and 
that practices, which have the potential to discriminate between spouses on grounds of 
sex, are excluded.  By treating women with equal concern and respect, the courts will 
construct a foundation of civil rights.  This is only a first step.  African women, like their 
Western counterparts, will have to take advantage of their new political rights and build 
upon them.  If women are not aware of the RCMA, it will merely remain ‘paper law’, and 
will not achieve its purpose. The best empowerment tool that can be utilised to realise the 
purpose of the RCMA is education. 
 
As stated earlier,187 most of the African women are not aware of their rights or the pot-
holes in South African law. But I am confident that African women cohabitees will pay 
attention to future developments in the law and will organise their lives accordingly. 
 
Throughout this research, the development of both the Common law and Customary law 
have been prominent. But I also agree with Currie,188 that all of us need a subtle 
understanding of cultural practices before we begin to tamper with them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
186  RCMA, 1998. 
187  Bonthuys (2002) at 757. 
188  Currie (1994) at 153-4. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WOMEN COHABITEES AND THE LAW 
 
1 Introduction 
Cohabitation has become extremely common in South Africa, and on this basis one 
would have expected that legislation would have undergone drastic change. Section 
15(3)(a)(i) of the Constitution189 should be interpreted as to include all cohabitees 
irrespective of race, colour and creed. There are many reasons why women across the 
racial spectrum opt to cohabit, and while our courts and legislature fail to acknowledge 
sufficiently that the Bill of Rights190 prohibits discrimination against non-traditional 
forms of family, cohabitation will remain, largely, outside the coverage of family law.  
 
I agree with Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden191 that within a short period of time our law 
has provided greater recognition and protection to women - but not to everyone! 
 
Some people are under the impression that if they live together as a couple for a number 
of years, they are considered to be ‘married’; and this ‘marriage’ has been referred to as a 
‘Common law marriage’ by some.192  
 
While most authors adopt the same definition for cohabitation, others have a different 
interpretation.  Schwellnus193 defines cohabitation as a ‘stable, monogamous relationship 
where couples who do not wish to, or are not allowed to, get married, live together as 
spouses’. The traditional definition limits the term cohabitation to two people of the 
opposite sex living together. In terms of the Constitution, however, this limitation is 
unwarranted.194  
 
                                                 
189  Constitution, 1996. 
190  Chapter Two of the Constitution, 1996. 
191  Sloth-Nielsen  and Van Heerden  (2003) at 123. 
192  E.g. Hahlo (1983) at 244. 
193  Schwellnus (2007) at 1. 
194  Section  9(3) of the Constitution, 1996  
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Hahlo195 says that the term ‘concubinage’ (alias ‘de facto marriage’, ‘quasi-marriage’, 
‘extra-marital cohabitation’, ‘putative marriage,’ ‘Common-law marriage’) connotes the 
relationship between a man and a woman who live together as ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ but 
have not gone through the legal ceremony of a marriage.  Hutchings and Delport196 
concur with Hahlo, that the term cohabitation is the most commonly employed term, 
because it is not a legal marriage and neither does it develop into one as a result of the 
lapse of time.  
 
In the Owen-Smith197 case the phrase ‘on a permanent basis’ was held to mean a 
relationship that was intended by the parties to continue indefinitely without change. 
Goldblatt198 opines that domestic partnership should be defined as ‘a permanent intimate 
life partnership between two adults’, a similar approach to that of the New South Wales 
Property Relationships Act,199 which should be followed. 
 
In general, I would agree with Schwellnus,200 that cohabitation is an emotionally, and/or 
physically, intimate relationship conducted in a Common living place. In comparison 
with civil and other form of marriage, these men and women are referred to as 
cohabitees. 
 
In South Africa cohabitation is not as common as in Europe and this may be as a result of 
South Africa’s conservative and Calvinistic background.201 Lind says that it is 
unsurprising that women would opt to be categorised as cohabitees despite the fear of 
insecurity and the legal consequences of their choice.202  
 
                                                 
195  Hahlo  (1983) at 244.  See also Sinclair assisted by Heaton (1996) at 267. 
196 Hutching and Delport (1992) at 122. Traditionally, the word ‘mistress’ was used by the courts to 
describe a woman cohabiting outside of marriage.  This term is outdated and inappropriate.  For other 
labels for cohabitation and the parties to it, and on the terminological difficulties generally, see Hahlo HR 
‘Cohabitation, Concubinage and the Common-Law Marriage’ in Kahn Fiat Iustitia 244 at 245 and ‘The 
Law of Concubinage’ (1972) 89 SALJ 321 at 321-322.   
197  Owen-Smith v Owen-Smith 1982 (1) SA 511 (ZSC).  
198  Goldblatt (2003) at 624. 
199  New South Wales Property Relationships Act, 1984. 
200  Schwellnus (2007) at 2. 
201  Schwellnus (2007) at 2. 
202  Lind  ‘Domestic partnerships and marital status discrimination’ in C Murray et al (2005) at p116. 
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Despite the fact that different legal systems attribute different requirements for 
cohabitation, it remains undisputed that three elements must exist in order to establish a 
cohabitation relationship.  The three elements consist of ‘a sexual relationship between 
the people’, ‘a factual cohabitative relationship and a measure of durability and stability 
for each other,’ as well as ‘a sense of responsibility for each other’.203 
 
South Africa demonstrates a rising trend in domestic partnerships. These domestic 
partnerships serve a role in meeting the financial, emotional and other needs of the people 
involved.204 Goldblatt205 says that more than a million South Africans are in non-marital 
relationships with their intimate partners.  Furthermore, ‘one of the main reasons for the 
prevalence of this type of relationship in South Africa is the extent of migrancy in our 
country’.206  The author207 further addresses the presumption that people who choose not 
to marry are exercising their freedom of choice in the South African context.  Mrs 
Robinson’s predicament in the Volk’s case208 is not a result of her and the deceased’s 
failure to marry; rather, it was because their failure to marry had become a feasible social 
option. 
 
In 2004 De Vos209 was of the opinion that cohabitees who choose not to marry will 
continue to be marginalised, and that the South African law will make no effort to protect 
the weaker and more vulnerable partners in such a relationship. 
 
Goldblatt distinguishes three types of cohabitation, namely:210 
‘ (a)  A man has a rural wife and cohabits with a woman in a long-term relationship 
  (b) Urban cohabitants without other ties who are in committed relationships   
  (c) “Easy come, easy go”: Cohabitation is seen as an impermanent arrangement of       
convenience that arises from material and other needs’.   
                                                 
203  Schwellnus (2007) at 2. 
204  Monareng (2007) at 126. 
205  Goldblatt  (2003)  at 610. 
206  Goldblatt (2003) at 610. 
207  Goldblatt (2003) at 610. 
208  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
209  De Vos (2004) at 187. 
210  Goldblatt (2003) at  613. 
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Clark211 is of the opinion that there is a wide range of different types of cohabitants 
ranging from those who are committed to each other to those who are merely in a 
‘contingent’ relationship. 
 
De Vos212 finds it ironic that same sex couples who have not entered into a civil union 
marriage receive more protection than heterosexual cohabitees despite the fact that most 
South Africans who cohabit are heterosexual and yet their relationships are not protected. 
 
2 Legal consequences of cohabitation 
Sinclair opines213 that the general rule of our law is that cohabitation does not give rise to 
special legal consequences irrespective of how long the relationship has endured.  
Cohabitation does not give rise to property rights unless the ordinary rules of the law of 
contract, property and unjustified enrichment might be invoked by a cohabitee in order to 
enforce rights acquired in or to each other’s property.214 
 
For most purposes, South Africa does not afford legal recognition to a ‘Common-law 
marriage’, no matter how long it has existed.  There is no law that regulates cohabitation, 
neither is there a ‘law of cohabitation’ similar to there being a law of husband and 
wife.215   
 
There are many practical problems arising from mere cohabitation and most of these 
problems only become prevalent when the relationship is terminated.  Although our law 
does not prohibit extra-marital cohabitation, it does not promote such relationships, in 
that the parties’ relationships generally do not enjoy special protection in family law.  
Legislation216 deals with marriages and cohabitation on an equal footing only in certain 
circumstances.217  This will be discussed later. 
                                                 
211  Clark  (2002) at 635. 
212  De Vos (2008) at p129. 
213  Sinclair (1996) at 274. 
214  Sinclair (1996) at 274. 
215  Schwellnus (2007) at 2. 
216  See eg, Insolvency Act, 1936, Pension Funds Act, 1956, COIDA, 1993 and Domestic Violence Act, 
1998.  
217  Visser and Potgieter (1998) at 45.  See also Hahlo (1983) at 248. 
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2.1 Universal partnership 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law distinguished between two types of universal partnerships, 
that is, societas universorum bonorum and societas universorum quae exquaestu 
veniunt.218 The former is one in which contracting parties agree to combine their assets, 
both of the present and of the future,219 and the latter is a partnership of all their profits.220 
In certain instances our courts have decided in favour of a party that an express or 
implied universal partnership proper (societas universorum bonorum) exists between the 
couple.  In order for the court to rule in favour of the party who claims that a universal 
partnership existed during their cohabitation, the applicant must satisfy four legal 
requirements, namely-221 
       ‘ (a) the aim of the partnership must be to make a profit; 
  (b) both parties must contribute to the enterprise; 
  (c) the partnership must operate for the benefit of both parties; and 
  (d) the contract between the parties must be legitimate’.       
 
However, this universal partnership is not regarded as a marriage; but when the 
relationship has irretrievably broken down, the courts will have the assets divided.222 Our 
courts will only regard such a partnership as valid if it was created either tacitly or 
expressly.223 Van Heerden, Cockrell and Keightly224 say that if a couple live together in a 
long-standing relationship, it may be held that the parties have tacitly or by implication 
                                                 
218  V. (also known as L.) v De Wet, N.O. 1953 (1) SA 613 (O) at 614E-H; Annabhay v Ramlall 1960 (3) SA 
802 (N) at 805A;  Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) at 453E-G. 
219   Snyman-Van Deventer and Henning (2003) 76; See also Muhlmann v Muhlmann 1984 (3) SA 102 (A). 
220  Annabhay v Ramlall (1960) at 805A; V (also known as L) v De Wet (1953) at 614G-H as per De Beer 
JP: ‘The second type of partnership known to Roman-Dutch Law, the societas universorum quae ex 
quaestu veniunt, is the usual contract of partnership where the parties intend that all they may acquire 
during its continuance from any and every kind of commercial venture, shall be partnership property’. See 
also Hahlo  South African Law of Husband and Wife 4th ed at 290 where the learned author states the 
following: ‘However, there must be something to indicate that the parties intended to operate as a 
partnership, the mere fact that the wife worked in her husband’s business without pay is not sufficient 
unless it can be shown that she made a substantial financial contribution or regularly rendered service going 
beyond those ordinarily expected of a wife in her situation, the courts will not be readily persuaded to 
imply a partnership agreement’.   
221  Schwellnus  (2007) at 3. 
222  E.g. Ally v Dinath  1984  (2) SA 451 (T) at 455D. 
223  E.g. Ally  v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) at 455A. 
224  Van Heerden , Cockrell and Keightley (1999) at 255. 
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entered into a universal partnership and accumulated a joint estate.  Hahlo225  is also of 
the opinion that if a man and his partner have pooled their resources or built up a business 
together, then the court may infer that they had the intention to establish a universal 
partnership.   
 
In the V (also known as L)226 case the Court held that the four requirements to establish a 
universal partnership had been met, and half of the partnership estate was awarded to the 
applicant.  However, in the Francis227 case the issue was whether a universal partnership 
had existed.  After the Court had addressed the requirements for the establishment of a 
universal partnership, it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove on a balance of 
probabilities the essential elements of the alleged partnership.  
 
A universal partnership is different from a marriage.  The former exists when a contract is 
concluded between the two parties in the relationship. Upon dissolution of such 
relationship, the assets are divided.    It is clear that a universal partnership is not easy to 
prove. In the Sepehri228 case the Court once again emphasised the importance of the four 
essential requirements in order to establish a universal partnership.   
 
2.2 Maintenance and duty to support 
According to Hutchings and Delport,229 when cohabitation is terminated during the 
lifetime of the cohabitants, no mutual duty of support exists between them.   
Schwellnus230 asserts that no enforceable right to claim maintenance from a cohabiting 
partner exists either during the cohabitative relationship or after termination of the 
relationship.  She argues further that cohabitation only has an effect on maintenance 
which is payable in respect of a previous marriage, where the court may follow one of 
two routes when it awards maintenance after a divorce.  The court will either ‘confirm a 
                                                 
225  Hahlo (1985) at 38.  
226  V (also known as L) v De Wet NO 1953 (1) SA 613 (O). 
227  Francis v Dhanai 2006 JOL 18401 (N). 
228  Sepehri v Scanlan 2008 (1) SA 322 (C).  
229  Hutchings and Delport (1992) at 122. See also Hahlo (1985) at 37,  and Clark (2002) at 639. 
230  Schwellnus (2007) at 7. 
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written agreement between the parties as an order of the court, or, in the absence of an 
agreement, award maintenance after considering the relevant factors’.  
 
The written agreement which stipulates that maintenance would cease upon cohabitation 
by a divorced recipient, is known as a dum casta clause231.  In South Africa, the courts 
have no objection to enforce such an agreement between two parties.232  However, our 
courts have different approaches to the terms of these agreements.  In the Schlesingerr233 
case Nicholas, J held that the relationship between the respondent and her partner cannot 
be construed as a marriage, and, therefore, the maintenance cannot cease just because the 
divorced respondent lives in concubinage.234 In Ex parte Dessels235 the Court upheld the 
validity of the condition on the ground that the condition intended to ensure that the 
annuity would cease not only on the widow’s remarriage, but also if she cohabits with a 
man as his wife.  The judgment in the Drummond236 case proved the contrary.  The issue 
was whether the appellant and her partner had cohabited, since the respondent had 
succeeded in the Court a quo to have the order for maintenance, in terms of section 10(1), 
set aside.237 The Court was satisfied that the appellant and her partner lived together as 
man and wife on a permanent basis, and the appeal was dismissed with costs238. 
 
Three years later, another court came to a similar conclusion. In the Owen-Smith239 case, 
the Court a quo held that the appellant deliberately refrained from getting married to her 
partner in order to protect her claim for maintenance from the respondent.  On appeal, the 
Court held that if a woman lives with a man in order to contribute to the expenses, it is 
                                                 
231  Schwellnus (2007) at 7. 
232  ‘Dum casta clause’ www.yahoo.com [accessed on 16/06/08] A maintenance agreement may embody a 
dum casta clause, that is, a clause which provides that the recipient will forfeit her maintenance if she fails 
to lead a chaste life.  However, the court will not read an implied clause to this effect into every 
maintenance agreement. 
233  Schlesinger  v Schlesinger 1968 (1) SA 699 (W). 
234  Schlesinger  v Schlesinger 1968 (1) SA 699 (W) at 700E-F. 
235 Ex parte  Dessels 1976 (1) SA 851 (D). 
236 Drummond v Drummond  1979 (1) SA 161 (A). 
237 Matrimonial Affairs Act, 1953. 
238 Drummond v Drummond  1979 (1) SA 161 (A) at 167A-B. 
239 Owen-Smith v Owen-Smith 1982 (1) SA 511 (ZSC). 
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immaterial whether she will marry him or not and the magistrate erred in reducing her 
maintenance.240 
 
The duty to support in respect of heterosexual unions which are stable and long-standing 
remains unclear in our law.  However, the Draft Bill241 makes provisions for all these 
uncertainties and its passing may see the light soon. 
 
2.3 Succession 
Another problem arises when looking at succession rights.  If the male partner dies 
during their cohabitation, the surviving spouse will only inherit if she has been named as 
heir in his will.  If there is no will, then the ISA242 will come into operation. 
 
In terms of the ISA,243 if a person dies intestate, the estate will devolve to a surviving 
spouse and, if there is no such spouse, then to the children of the deceased.  If there is no 
such spouse or children, the estate will go to the parents or other relatives.  If there are no 
such relatives, the estate will pass as bona vacantia to the state.  The surviving cohabitee 
will have no right to claim.244  
 
In terms of testate succession, a surviving cohabitee can only inherit if the deceased 
leaves a valid will instituting him or her as heir or legatee.  The deceased cohabitee is 
entitled to disinherit a spouse or children in order to make provision for a cohabitee.  The 
testator will, however, have to make it clear that he or she wants to benefit the cohabiting 
partner.245  
 
                                                 
240  Owen-Smith v Owen-Smith 1982 (1) SA 511 (ZSC) at 518G-H. 
241  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
242  ISA, 1987. 
243  ISA, 1987. 
244  Schwellnus (2007) at 13. 
245  Sinclair (1996) at 289.  See also Schwellnus (2007) at 13. 
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Despite the fact that certain legislative benefits extend to cohabitees (See later), these 
relationships are still deprived of protection as far as the distribution of property or 
maintenance upon the death of one of the partners are concerned.246 
 
During the last ten years, the Constitutional Court has provided protection for a number 
of different family forms that used to fall outside of the traditional marriage relationship.  
The Volks case247 underpins the failure of our law to keep pace with social change and 
this failure generalises the problem Mrs Robinson faced.   
 
The Volks248 case is the most recent case in which the Constitutional Court has declined 
to develop the law relating to maintenance under the MOSSA249 and intestate succession 
under the ISA250 where the majority of the Constitutional Court decided not to involve 
itself in the transformation of the law regulating cohabitation.  In casu, Mrs Robinson and 
Mr Shandling, the deceased, had been in a permanent life partnership for 16 years. They 
never married (although there was no legal impediment to the marriage) and no children 
were born of this relationship. Mrs Robinson regarded their relationship as a ‘permanent 
life partnership’. Mr Volks, the executor of Mr Shandling’s deceased estate, did not 
dispute the characterisation of the relationship as a ‘permanent life partnership’. Mrs 
Robinson’s inheritance consisted of a Toyota motor vehicle, the contents of the flat which 
she and the deceased had occupied, as well as a sum of R100 000.  Mrs Robinson was 
only entitled to live in the house for a period not exceeding nine months.  Upon the death 
of Mr Shandling, Mrs Robinson filed a maintenance claim against his estate in terms of 
the MOSSA251. The section in question was section 2(1) which reads as follows: 
 
‘If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act the survivor shall 
have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable 
                                                 
246  Goldblatt (2008) at 6. 
247  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
248  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
249  MOSSA, 1990. 
250  ISA, 1987. 
251  ISA, 1987. 
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maintenance needs until his death or remarriage insofar as he is not able to provide 
therefore from his own means and earnings’. 
 
Mr Volks refused the claim on the basis that the Act did not include cohabitees.  Despite 
the refusal, Mr Volks never disputed the fact that Mrs Robinson and the deceased had 
supported one another financially and emotionally, and that both had regarded their 
relationship to be a permanent one.  Mrs Robinson applied to the High Court (the Court a 
quo) to challenge the definition of ‘survivor’ in the Act.  She argued that the exclusion of 
permanent life partners was a violation of her rights to equality and dignity and that it 
was unconstitutional.   
 
The High Court developed the law to include cohabitation within the ambit of the 
MOSSA252.  The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.253  The 
majority of judges in the Constitutional Court, however, refused to concur with the 
decision of the High Court.  Skweyiya J, who gave the majority judgment, agreed with 
the decision of the High Court only to the extent in that the Act is not capable of being 
interpreted so as to include heterosexual cohabitees. The majority was also of the opinion 
that the aim of the Act is to extend one of the invariable consequences of marriage, duty 
of support, beyond the death of the spouses.  This duty does not arise in unmarried 
relationships.   
 
There is some light at the end of the tunnel in that three Justices gave their dissenting 
judgments in favour of Mrs Robinson.  What is really sad is that the majority judgment 
concluded that if they allow Mrs Robinson to benefit under the Act, it would mean 
imposing a legal duty of support after death whereas it never existed during the 
deceased’s lifetime.   
 
                                                 
252  MOSSA, 1990. 
253 Section 172(2)(b) of the Constitution, 1996 states that ‘A court which makes an order of constitutional 
invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the 
proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of that Act or conduct’. 
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The Court acknowledged the vulnerability of the female cohabitee, as well as the 
dependence of women in heterosexual unmarried relationships, not only in South Africa 
but also in other countries.254  It is regrettable, however, that while Skweyiya J displayed 
concern for the plight of female cohabitees,255 his decision moved in a different direction.  
Significant was the dissenting judgment of Mokgoro J and O’Regan J, in which they 
concluded that the ‘cohabiting partners under consideration in this case are a vulnerable 
group’.256  
 
I applaud the dissenting judgments of Sachs J and Mokgoro J and O’Regan J, who sought 
to understand the way in which families work and who understood that maintenance is 
definitely concerned with survival.   
 
De Vos257 argues that the majority judgment either failed to apply the appropriate ‘test’ 
for unfair discrimination as contained in the Constitution,258 which had been developed 
by the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane,259 or that it attempted to apply the correct 
test, but was unsuccessful.   
 
It is evident that the decision of the majority in the Volks case260 has negative 
implications for those women living similar lives, because this case is the most recent 
reported case of the highest court.  The reasons for the rejection of her claim should have 
been treated with much more caution. Why would certain legislation regard women in the 
position of Mrs Robinson as a ‘spouse’ and a ‘survivor’, but the same words in the 
MOSSA261 cannot be interpreted as such? The majority was also of the opinion that the 
Common law duty of support is so isolated from the question of the constitutionality of 
                                                 
254  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 63.   
255  See, for example, the concerns of Skweyiya J at paras 64-66. 
256  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 124. 
257  De Vos (2008) at 131. 
258  Section 9(3) of the Constitution, 1996  
259  Harksen v Lane  1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para 54. 
260  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
261  MOSSA, 1990. 
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section 2(1) of the Act, that the Constitutional Court could not address it; but the minority 
in their dissenting judgments addressed the issue.262 
 
Cooke263 is also of the opinion that the decision of the majority, that no duty of support 
existed, was in stark contrast to the factors that the dissenting judgments cited as 
evidence of such a duty.   
 
The focus should not only be on a duty to support, but also on other areas of law, e.g. 
intestate succession,264 criminal procedure265 etc.  Some statutes have been amended to 
include cohabitees and the fact that the MOSSA266 has not yet been amended as to 
recognise the female cohabitee as a ‘survivor’ and a ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Act, 
should not be taken as indicative of a legislative intent to exclude partners from the 
protection of the law.   
 
2.4 Statutory recognition 
2.4.1 Insolvency Act267 
The Insolvency Act268 includes in the definition of ‘spouse’ a woman who is living with a 
man as his wife or a man who is living with a woman as her husband, who are not 
married to one another in both cases.  The Act provides that if a separate estate of one of 
two spouses, who are not living apart, is sequestrated, the estate of the solvent as well as 
that of the insolvent spouse vests in the Master, and then in the trustee of the insolvent 
estate.  The estate of the solvent spouse has to be released if he or she proves that it was 
acquired by a title which cannot be assailed by the creditors of the insolvent spouse.  
However, if the insolvent spouse is legally married and he or she cohabits with another 
partner, the estate of his or her spouse, and not that of his or her partner, will vest in the 
Master and trustee.269 
                                                 
262  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).at para 216. 
263  Cooke (2005) at 544. 
264  There is no right of intestate succession between cohabitants.  See Sinclair (1996) at 289. 
265  Section 198 of the CPA (1997). 
266  MOSSA, 1990. 
267  Insolvency Act, 1936. 
268  Section 21(13). See also Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 229.   
269  Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 229.  See also Hahlo (1983) at 249. 
 
 
 
 
 48
In Chaplin NO v Gregory (or Wyld),270 the preference of the law for legal wives worked 
to the disadvantage of the legal wife.  In this instance the insolvent spouse lived with his 
mistress, apart from his legal wife.  The Court held that the estate of his legal wife, not 
that of his Common-law wife, vested in the trustee.271  
 
2.4.2  Pension Funds Act272 
In terms of this Act, pension benefits may, after the death of a member of the fund, be 
paid either to the dependants of the deceased member, or to a nominee.273  Dependants 
include both legal and factual dependants of a fund member.  This has the effect that a 
cohabitee may qualify as a factual dependant, provided that, despite the fact that, though 
such a member is not legally obligated to maintain his or her cohabitee, he or she did in 
fact maintain the other one.274  However, if the cohabitee was financially independent of 
the member, such cohabitee will not qualify as the member’s factual dependant.275 
 
2.4.3 COIDA276 
In this Act, section 1(c) provides that if one of the cohabitees dies as a result of injuries 
received during the course of employment, his or her partner may claim compensation if 
the latter can prove that he or she was ‘at the time of the accident … wholly or partly 
financially dependent upon the employee’.277  The Act states clearly that the claim is only 
available in the absence of a legal spouse at the time of the accident.278 
 
2.4.4 Domestic Violence Act279 
In terms of section 1 of this Act, a cohabitee is granted protection from violence in their 
relationship and protection is granted to ‘all people in a domestic relationship’.280 
                                                 
270   Chaplin v Gregory (or Wyld) 1950 (3) SA 555 (C). 
271   Sinclair (1996) at 290. 
272   Pension Funds Act, 1956. 
273   Section 37C (1) (a). 
274   Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 229. 
275   Schwellnus (2007) at 15. 
276   COIDA, 1993 section (1) (c). 
277   Sinclair (1996) at 285. 
278   Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 229. 
279   Domestic Violence Act, 1998. 
280   Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 229.  See also Clark (2002) at 637 and  Schwellnus (2007) at 16. 
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3 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to address the failure of our law to expand discretionary judicial 
powers to provide equal protection to heterosexual cohabitants, particularly women. If 
there is no intervention, in the context of cohabitation, it will allow substantial suffering 
to continue in terms of the female cohabitee.  
 
Since heterosexual cohabitation is not legally recognised currently, it is evident that 
judges and magistrates are powerless to do anything.  Judges and magistrates cannot 
enforce a law or provide a legal remedy to a relationship that is not legally protected.  
South African legislation, like English law, has not been consistent. As yet, there is no 
single statute that regulates heterosexual cohabitation or addresses the consequences of 
its breakdown. 
 
Fortunately, the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill281 may provide some relief if and when 
Parliament decides to enact it.  (The Draft Bill will be discussed in Chapter six).  
 
As stated earlier, the victims of the collapse of domestic partnerships are largely women, 
finding themselves without legal redress, unless they happen to fall under one of the 
statutes that offer limited protection, e.g. the Domestic Violence Act282. Those who suffer 
most are women cohabitees, and they are mostly the ones, after the termination of the 
relationship, who are left without assets or support. 
 
The increase in cohabitation is indicative of changing mores.  Many people are accepting 
cohabitation these days and although the moral and social stigmas attached thereto have 
not disappeared completely, they have diminished substantially.  
 
I am of the opinion that our law fails to protect women who cohabit, since domestic 
partnerships entail mutual dependence and support, and the legal duty of support should 
be extended to them.  When the legislature fulfils its duty, it will clarify and simplify 
                                                 
281  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
282  Domestic Violence Act, 1998. 
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issues, such as, maintenance, dependant’s action for damages, maintenance of a surviving 
partner out of the deceased’s estate, etc. But now the Draft Bill283 has changed that 
perception of the majority in South Africa, despite some criticism against it. 
 
Mrs Robinson’s misfortune causes one to ask further questions, such as, whether her 
situation was the most appropriate one to test the rights of heterosexual cohabitants?  
How does a person determine when somebody is vulnerable enough for a court to come 
to his or her assistance?  In this context, one can submit that, by contrast, it was 
theoretically open to Mrs Robinson and Mr Shandling to marry and, by doing so, that 
would have brought about the ensuing mutual duty of support.  However, they exercised 
their freedom of choice. 
 
In my view, the Legislature has a duty to intervene in order to help vulnerable cohabitees 
and the passing of the Draft Bill284 will fulfill that duty. 
 
The Draft Bill285 does not only contain clauses to provide protection for intestate 
succession286 but also for delictual claims287 and any reference to ‘spouse’ in the 
MOSSA288 includes the cohabitee.289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
283  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
284  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
285  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
286  Clause 20. 
287  Clause 21. 
288  MOSSA, 1990. 
289  Clause 19. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
WOMEN COHABITEES AND  MARRIAGE PARTNERS: A COMPARISON 
 
1 Introduction 
 
              ‘… a man and woman who, for good or bad elect to live in          
  concubinage rather than marry, make a deliberate choice and cannot          
  complain if the consequences of marriage do not attach to their   
  union. To use a well-worn cliché, they cannot “have their cake and   
  eat it”. I am not persuaded that there is a case for creating a special                      
  status of concubinage, either equivalent in its effect to a valid    
  marriage or positioned somewhere between a marriage and a passing,   
  promiscuous relationship’.290  
 
This 1972 statement is one of the reasons that prompted me to conduct this research with 
regard to cohabitation in South Africa.   
 
Having regard to my discussion of African Customary, and Muslim marriages, as well as 
cohabitation generally, it is evident that the Legislature is in the position to provide 
protection for women in a domestic relationship291 in the form of the Draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill292 which was tabled specifically to address the protection for cohabitees. 
 
The aim of this research, inter alia, has been to determine whether any development in 
relation to the law relevant to cohabitation will transpire.293  The Civil Union Act294 came 
into operation on 30 November 2006. The purpose of the Act is ‘to provide for the 
solemnisation of civil unions, by way of either a marriage or civil partnership …’295 but 
the position of heterosexual cohabitees appears to be less certain. 
 
                                                 
290 Hahlo (1972) 331. 
291 The Constitution, 1996. Section 9(4) states that ‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including… marital status…’. 
292 Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
293 Draft  Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
294 Civil Union Act, 2006. 
295 Civil Union Act, 2006. 
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The RCMA296 denotes the development with regard to Customary marriages, and gives 
the woman the option to either enter into a Customary marriage or a civil marriage.  The 
RCMA297, in particular, protects the equal status of women to that of men.298 Whilst one 
can applaud the gradual development of this by means of case law as well as legislation, 
the relief, however, has been only for women in Customary marriages and, to a certain 
extent, Islamic marriages, but there has been no relief for cohabitees in similar 
circumstances.299 
 
This chapter will investigate the difference between marriage and cohabitation in terms of 
the legal consequences attached to such relationships. A distinction must be drawn 
between marriage and cohabitation, and the decision in the Volks300 case illustrates the 
discrimination against females who choose to cohabit.  The question that raises the most 
concern is: How should the law treat people who choose to live in what is called 
cohabitation, but which does not result in marriage? The problem is actually complicated 
by a lack of definitional clarity of what, for instance, could be included under ‘marriage’ 
or ‘spouse’ in our family law. This is clear from the Daniels case,301 and the Volks 
case.302 
 
The majority judgment in the Volks303 case demonstrates no compassion for the social 
and economic context of women’s lives, and the disadvantage suffered by them.304   
 
According to Jagwanth,305 women who cohabit are stigmatised and suffer tremendous 
prejudice, which the Legislature fails to address.  The Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill306 
attempts to alleviate this stigmatisation. 
                                                 
296  RCMA, 1998. 
297  RCMA, 1998. 
298  Seemela v Minister of Safety and Security (1998) 1 ALL SA 408 (W) at 410B-D.   
299  Volks NO  v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
300  Volks NO  v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
301  Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC). 
302  Robinson and Another v Volks NO and Others 2004 (6) SA 288 (C). 
303  Volks NO  v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at paras 63-68. 
304  Lind  ‘Domestic partnerships and marital status discrimination’ in C Murray et al  (2005) at 112. 
305 Jagwanth  ‘Expanding equality’ in C Murray et al (2005) at 136. 
306  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
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More questions come to mind when one attempts to differentiate between the two 
concepts, namely, marriage and cohabitation. To some extent, they are so synonymous 
with each other, and yet legislation provides full legal protection to marriage but only 
some protection to cohabitation. 
 
Marriage, including polygynous marriages in terms of the RCMA,307 and civil unions, are 
currently the only legally recognised intimate partnership. Whereas marriage is 
considered to be sacred, cohabitation has a more sinister connotation, and is regarded as a 
threat to the institution of marriage and to a stable society.308  Traditionally cohabitation 
refers to the relationship between a man and a woman who live together apparently as 
husband and wife, without having gone through a legal ceremony of marriage.309  
 
At first, the High Court in the Volks310 case gave the impression that cohabitation and 
marriage was on an equal footing, and that both shared the same legal consequences on 
the death of a spouse or partner, but the turning point came when the majority in the 
Constitutional Court decided that there was a distinction between marriage and 
cohabitation, and that this distinction could not be construed as to be unfair.311 
Cohabitation without marriage is common, and over the years various issues relating to 
the position of women in society and the disadvantages suffered by them, have been 
identified.312 
 
Therefore this chapter attempts to harmonise the law in this area with the rights to 
equality313 and dignity314 contained in the Draft Bill of Rights.  The emphasis is on the 
existence of equality between marriage and cohabitation, and the Legislature and the 
Court’s failure to develop the Common law with regard to cohabitation, but specifically 
                                                 
307   RCMA, 1998. 
308  Hutchings and Delport (1992) at 121; see also Kaganas and Murray (1991) Acta Juridica 116; Dlamini 
(1985) at 701. 
309  Hahlo (1983) at 244; see also Bekker (1991) at 1. 
310  Robinson and Another  v Volks NO and Others 2004 (6) SA 288 (C). 
311  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 56. 
312  See Church (1997) at 289.  
313  Constitution, 1996 section 9. 
314  Constitution, 1996 section 10. 
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the Legislature’s reluctance to expedite the enactment of the 2008 Draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill. 
 
2  Distinction between marriage and cohabitation 
Different forms of marriages are recognised in South African law. We can distinguish 
between monogamous civil marriages, monogamous and polygynous African Customary 
marriages, monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages, and other marriages.  The 
civil marriage is the marriage that was introduced via the Roman-Dutch law. When the 
RCMA315 came into effect, Customary marriages were recognised as valid marriages. 
One of the great advantages of a society based on the marriage relationship is that 
marriage is easily proved. Cohabitation, on the other hand, not only exists for a variety of 
reasons, but a greater variety of circumstances might be used to demonstrate whether or 
not it exists.316 
 
There are some significant differences between marriage and cohabitation, as determined 
by our legislation and case law.317  Marriage partners are unable to enter into another civil 
marriage during the subsistence of the marriage, whereas both partners who cohabit are 
entitled to conclude a civil marriage with someone else.318 Spouses are obliged to provide 
maintenance to one another, but cohabitees are not obliged to provide maintenance unless 
the parties have contractually agreed to it.319 The marriage can only be terminated during 
the lifetime of both spouses by an order of divorce, but cohabitees need no order from a 
court to terminate their relationship.320   
 
In the Volks321 case Skweyiya J acknowledged that women in domestic partnerships were 
often unmarried because they had no choice in the matter, but held that the answer lay in 
regulating long-term life partnerships through legislation.322  
                                                 
315  RCMA, 1998. 
316  Lind  (2005) at 122. 
317  Examples are the ISA (1987), MOSSA (1990) and the Volks case (2005). 
318  Robinson (2009) at 40. 
319  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 56. 
320  Robinson (2009) at 40. 
321  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 59. 
322  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at paras 64-66. 
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In the first place, as in other societies, in South African family law marriage is recognised 
as a legal institution.323 This is clear from the various legislative enactments that provides 
for its conclusion and dissolution.324  
 
One of the arguments against the recognition of domestic partnership, is that it can 
undermine the sacredness of marriage, and discourage people from marrying.325  These 
marginalised, vulnerable people of society are only protected, to some extent, if they 
conclude any valid marriage or a civil union.326 
 
Sinclair327 says that marriage ‘is most often distinguishable from cohabitation only by the 
piece of paper that testifies to its existence’.   
 
Murray328 argues that women would be able to show oppressive practices irrespective of 
the type of marriage they may be in. I would say that many people in South Africa see 
little difference between marriage and cohabitation.  
 
Although most international instruments dealing with human rights and many 
constitutions of other countries,329 contain specific provisions on the protection of 
families as well as the right to marry, there are no such provisions in the Constitution of 
South Africa.330 I prefer to argue that our courts should focus more on section 15(3)(a) of 
the Constitution that states clearly- 
     ‘This section does not prevent legislation recognizing –  
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law; or 
                                                 
323  Robinson  et al (2009) at 40. 
324  Notably the Marriage Act, 1961 and the Divorce Act, 1979. 
325  See Hahlo (1983)  at 262-3. 
326  De Vos (2008) at 129. 
327  Sinclair  (1996) at 293. 
328  Murray (1994) at 37; also see Church J (1997) at 292. 
329  See Article 23(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (1996) which was ratified 
by South Africa in December 1998; see too The Africa [Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
(1986) ratified by South Africa in July 1986. 
330  See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 T (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), in which the Constitutional 
Court rejected the argument that the present Constitution should contain such a right. 
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(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion’. 
 
Currently marriage is also seen as an institution which forms the basis of the social 
structure which serves the public interest, and which is the focus of public attention.  In 
Ryland v Edros,331 Farlam J indicated the need for South African family law to recognise 
diversity in marriage forms and the possibility of a pluralistic recognition of different 
forms of marriage, including the potentially polygynous Muslim marriage.332 
 
3  Why do people choose to cohabit? 
Hutchings and Delport333 opine that one should distinguish between persons who do not 
wish to marry and those persons who are not allowed to marry. According to these 
authors, the former occurs either because of a previous unhappy marriage, or the parties 
may feel that their relationship might be spoilt by the formality of marriage. They opine 
that cohabitation, on the other hand, represents a more flexible, free and equal 
relationship. This has, therefore, become an important factor in choosing cohabitation 
above marriage.334 
 
Those not allowed to marry, include persons within the prohibited degrees of blood-
relationship or affinity.  A person may naturally not marry if he or she is already married.  
Most of these people view cohabitation as the only solution.335  
 
Clark336 avers that most cohabitees prefer not to formalize their relationship publicly. 
Some couples prefer cohabitation because it does not legally commit them for an 
extended period, and because it is easier to establish and dissolve without the pricey legal 
costs often associated with a divorce.  
 
                                                 
331  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) at 704D. 
332  Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) at 704D. 
333  Hutchings and Delport (1992)  at 122.  
334  Hutchings and Delport  (1992) at 122. 
335  Hutchings and Delport (1992) at 122. 
336  Clark (2002) at 635. 
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Goldblatt,337 on the other hand, states that migrancy is one of the main reasons why 
people in South Africa cohabit.  She says that there are people who are of the view that 
those people who choose cohabitation above marriage are merely exercising their 
freedom of choice because the consequences attached to marriage eliminate their 
powers.338 
  
Lind339 is amazed that so many people choose to cohabit despite the insecurity attached to 
it, as well as the legal position they find themselves in.  The author states further that if 
South Africans perceived marriage as the exclusive field of relationship, the coming into 
effect of the Constitution changed that perception.340 This averment is also supported by 
the progress towards the recognition of cohabitation made in legislation since 1996.341   
 
 Schwellnus342 opines that parties are cohabiting if they have a stable relationship in 
which they cohabit as married persons.  Heterosexual cohabitation differs from marriage, 
both as regards the way it is entered into, and as regards to the consequences it entails.   
 
Monareng343 is of the opinion that the main reasons why people cohabit are 
        ‘1 Poverty and unemployment: women get into these relationships because most  of 
them need men to support them and their children, because men usually have 
access to work, income and accommodation. 
2 Women are in a weaker position than men and are unable to compel their 
partners to marry them.  Men refuse, because they know they will be able to enter 
and leave relationships freely with no legal obligations to support the woman. 
3 Legal ignorance.  Many women believe that simply living with a man for a 
period of time will entitle them to legal rights. 
                                                 
337  Goldblatt (2003) at 610. 
338  Goldblatt (2003) at  615 
339  Lind (2005) at  116. 
340  Lind (2005) at 116. 
341  Lind (2005) at 116. 
342  Schwellnus (2007) at 1. 
343 Monareng (2007) at 128; see also Goldblatt  (2003) at 610. 
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4 Some men are married to other spouses and, accordingly, cannot marry their 
current partner’. 
 
Monareng344 states further that some African cohabitees erroneously believe that if they 
cohabit for more than 6 months, their relationship will be recognised and they will be 
entitled to support upon the termination of their relationship. 
 
4  Principle of equality 
It is important to remember that Mrs Robinson in the Volks345 case was simply the latest 
example of the inequality in all family relationships by married women as well as women 
who cohabit in the current social climate.  In the Volks346 case the majority found that 
Mrs Robinson’s claim could only succeed if she could convince the Court that the 
MOSSA347 breached the equality right entrenched in section 9 of the Constitution. 
 
After the Volks348 case, the first version of the Draft Civil Union Bill349 contained 
provisions dealing with domestic partnerships. Parliament, however, enacted the Civil 
Union Act350 in November 2006 but excluded the provisions dealing with heterosexual 
domestic partnerships.351 The provisions of this Act had an effect to the judgment in the 
Gory352 case where the Court gave recognition not only to married same sex couples but 
also to unmarried same sex partners.353 The same rights were not extended to 
heterosexual cohabitees.354  It was only in 2008 that the Draft Domestic Partnerships 
Bill355 was tabled for the public’s comment. The Draft Bill356 is a step in the right 
direction and when passed, the relevant equality and human dignity will be provided.  
                                                 
344  Monareng (2007) at 126. 
345  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
346  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 49. 
347  MOSSA, 1990. 
348  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
349  Civil Union Bill (2006). 
350  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
351  Goldblatt (2008) at 1. 
352  Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC). 
353  Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) at para 29. 
354  De Vos (2008) at 130. 
355  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
356  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 59
Subject to a few criticisms regarding the Draft Bill,357 all our hopes and beliefs to be 
treated equally and with dignity are contained in the Draft Bill.358 It is so ironic that 
Parliament is delaying the enactment of the Draft Bill359 and yet it recognised registered 
partnerships for same sex partners. 
      
5  Conclusion 
The position of the woman in society has improved dramatically over the past few years, 
and the growing trend towards individualism has led to women’s economic, social and 
sexual independence.  Independence and equality are of the utmost importance to modern 
women, and traditional marriages were often seen to enforce inequality.360  It is not only 
the courts that have a duty to ensure that equality, which is one of the objectives of the 
Constitution, is achieved;  the Legislature also has the task of ensuring that the law is not 
inconsistent with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.361  
 
Heterosexual cohabitation is presently not legally recognised and, until it is, judges and 
magistrates are powerless to do anything.  They cannot enforce a law upon a relationship 
that is not legally protected.   
 
The Civil Union Act362 was enacted to afford protection for same sex marriages and 
domestic partnerships.  The emphasis was on the fact that the partners must have 
undertaken reciprocal duties.363  
 
Since 1994 the law has changed significantly to recognise not only Customary 
monogamous and polygynous marriages but also Muslim monogamous and polygynous 
marriages to some extent, same-sex marriages and registered partnerships.364 African and 
Muslim marriages underpin development because the consequences of non-recognition 
                                                 
357  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
358  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
359  Draft  Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
360  See Hutchings and Delport (1992) at 122. 
361  Constitution, 1996. Section 35(3). 
362  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
363  Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) at para 28. 
364 The Alliance (2008) at 3 
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can be offensive for members of the family; left unprotected by law, they are accorded 
few of the rights enjoyed by members of legally constituted families.  Following earlier 
decisions on monogamous Muslim marriages, the decision in the Hassam365 case has 
brought some relief for Muslim women who find themselves in  polygynous marriages.   
 
The RCMA366 was enacted to bring relief to Customary marriages and to recognise the 
rights of people to practise their customs and culture.  It was also enacted to ensure that 
women in Customary marriages are entitled to an adequate share upon the dissolution of 
the marriage.  If women are not aware of the Act, it will just be a ‘paper law’ and the Act 
will not achieve its purpose.367  The best empowerment tool that can be utilised to realise 
the purpose of the Act, is education.368   
 
The only hope for cohabitees now lies in the enactment of the Draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill.369  
 
The question that some people would ask is: Is it desirable to impose laws upon 
cohabitants who obviously wish to escape the legal implications of marriage?  Some 
authors370 are of the opinion that marriage, the cornerstone of our society, would be 
threatened if the law gave even the vaguest recognition to cohabitation. 
 
Some people do, after all, choose to cohabit without marriage in order to avoid the legal 
consequences of marriage. Those who live family lives outside of the traditional norms of 
marriage, will be left with the unjust results which the Constitutional Court in the 
Volks371 case  recognised, but failed to resolve.372   
 
                                                 
365 Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC). 
366 RCMA, 1998. 
367 Monareng (2007) at 129. 
368 Monareng  (2007) at 129. 
369 Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
370 See Goldblatt (2003) at 617.  See also Clark (2002) at 636-637, and Cooke  (2005) at 557. 
371 Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
372 Lind (2005) at 130. 
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The Volks373 case illustrates that factors such as that the parties have shown their 
commitment to a shared household, the existence of a significant period of cohabitation, 
and the nature of financial and other dependency should be taken into account in 
assessing whether the arrangements that subsist constitute a domestic life partnership.374   
 
The responsibility lies with the individual to protect his or her rights through an 
agreement that regulates the relationship itself. 375 It is trite that the institution of 
marriage is regarded as a sacred union, and that it represents a fundamental aspect of 
society.  This is emphasised by the way marriages are deemed to come into existence in 
terms of South African law albeit civil marriages, Customary marriages, Muslim 
marriages and civil unions. Any union that does not comply with the stipulated 
requirements of a civil union or any other marriage, does not enjoy the protection of the 
law.  This is evident throughout this research. The Draft Bill376 makes provision for most 
of the protection afforded to married couples and, therefore, it is imperative that 
Parliament must expedite its enactment, since it ignored the plight of cohabitees when the 
Civil Union Act377 came into operation.  The Draft Bill378 should be lauded for containing 
two categories of domestic partnerships, namely, registered domestic partnerships and 
unregistered domestic partnerships, 
 
In the Volks379 case the Court was not asked to draft legislation that would regulate 
unmarried relationships.  According to Lind,380 Mrs Robinson was simply asking the 
Court to find that the MOSSA381 was inconsistent with the Constitution. Since the Court 
had sympathy for the vulnerability of cohabitants, one would have expected that it would 
find the statute in question to be non-compliant with the Constitution.382  Cooke argues 
that this finding would have been one way to reduce that vulnerability, yet it may not 
                                                 
373  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
374  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 18. 
375  See Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) at 453G. 
376  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
377  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
378  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
379  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para 49. 
380  Lind  (2005) at 120. 
381  MOSSA, 1990. 
382  Cooke (2005) at 557. 
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have totally eliminated the vulnerability of cohabitants, but it would have narrowed the 
scope of their vulnerability.383   
 
Rautenbach384 states that the non-recognition of cohabitation violates the values of 
human dignity and equality.  
 
Lind385 says that it is entrenched in the Constitution that the drafting and practice of the 
law must promote and pursue equality actively.386 This is the most useful way in which 
the law can be used to remedy patterns of past inequality, even in the instance that the 
majority judges in Volks387 appeared to have failed.388  
 
In order to achieve legal certainty about the recognition of domestic partnerships, 
legislative recognition should be given to all domestic partnerships in order to protect 
females in circumstances similar to those of Mrs Robinson in Volks.389  As mentioned 
earlier, Muslim polygynous marriages have received some recognition in South Africa. 
The RCMA390 also serves as an example with the recognition of polygynous Customary 
marriages as valid marriages. We also have the proposed Muslim Marriages Bill as well 
as the Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008.  
 
I therefore submit that it is of paramount importance that some degree of legal guidance 
is essential to clarify the position with regard to cohabitation and that the enactment of 
the Draft Bill391 must see the light to bring cohabitees on equal footing with their married 
counterparts. 
 
 
                                                 
383  Cooke  (2005) at 557. 
384  Rautenbach and Du Plessis (2000) at 309. 
385  Lind (2005) at 117. 
386  Constitution, 1996. Section 9(2). 
387  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
388  Lind (2005) at 117. 
389  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
390  RCMA , 1998.  
391  Draft  Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DRAFT DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS BILL 
 
1  Introduction 
The long awaited Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill made its appearance on 14 January 
2008.  This Draft Bill raised the hopes of cohabitees that they would receive the same 
legal protection as their married counterparts. The Department of Home Affairs published 
the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill392 (hereinafter the Draft Bill) in order to allow the 
public to give its input in respect thereof.  The Department of Home Affairs had 
approached the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) during 1996 to 
investigate and recommend legislation for a new marriage dispensation for South 
Africa.393  The SALRC invited interested parties and bodies to comment on the adequacy 
of the Marriage Act.394 
 
In 1984 New South Wales, Australia, enacted the De Facto Relationships Act395 which 
granted extensive rights to heterosexual domestic partners, and put them almost on an 
equal legal footing with married couples.  Goldblatt396 states that this presumption-based 
approach to de facto relationships is a progressive and practical model where the focal 
point is to focus on the functions of specific relationships rather than on their form. 
Goldblatt also raises an interesting point, namely that since the law has generally been 
written by middle class men, other members of society, namely women, gay men and 
lesbians, the indigent and disadvantaged groups found themselves outside the law’s 
positive embrace,397 
 
                                                 
392  Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008).  
393  SALRC (2006) at 1. 
394  Marriage Act, 1961. 
395  De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (NSW). 
396  Goldblatt  (2008) at 4. 
397  Goldblatt (2008) at 3. 
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Before the drafting of the Draft Bill a report398, calling for a system of registration of 
domestic partnerships alongside the recognition of de facto partnerships, was 
incorporated in the Civil Union Bill.399  This report was heavily influenced by the New 
South Wales’ De Facto Relationships Act.400 The Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS) recommended that Parliament should accept the provisions of the Bill401 which 
regarded domestic partnerships.  According to the CALS submission,402 the 2001 census 
revealed that 2 389 705 individuals described themselves as living in domestic 
partnerships, and that this large group of people, unfortunately, did not fall within the 
scope of family law. According to the Alliance, the CALS conducted research as to why 
people cohabit, and the research indicated that poor women have limited choices with 
regards to the type of relationship in which they find themselves or their financial 
arrangements.403  In the Volks404 case the Court held that: 
‘Structural dependence of women in marriage and in relationships of heterosexual 
unmarried couples is a reality in our country and in other countries.  Many women 
become economically dependent on men and are left destitute and suffer hardships on the 
death of their male partners…’.405 
 
The Court said that legislative intervention to assist these vulnerable women, who are 
mostly poor and illiterate, was appropriate and necessary.406 
 
According to Goldblatt407 the first draft of the Civil Union Bill408 also contained 
provisions which dealt with the recognition of domestic partnerships, but that, during the 
preparation of the second draft of the Civil Union Bill,409 intervention took place.  
                                                 
398  Goldblatt (2008) at 6. 
399  Civil Union Bill (2006). 
400  De Facto Relationships Act, 1984. 
401  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
402  Centre for Applied Legal Studies (2006) at 2. 
403 The Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships ‘Submission to the Department of 
Home Affairs on the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008,’ (2008) at 2. 
404  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
405  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at paras 63-4. 
406  Centre for Applied Legal Studies (2006) at 3. 
407  Goldblatt (2008) at 7. 
408  Civil Union Bill (2006). 
409  Civil Union Bill (2006). 
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Goldblatt410 asserts that the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee made a recommendation 
that the section which deals with domestic partnerships should be removed because of 
time constraints, and as a result of the complexity of the issues involved.  The Civil 
Union Act was passed in 2006 without the section that deals with domestic partnerships.  
The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee also undertook to table a Domestic Partnerships 
Bill in 2007, but to no avail.411  The Draft Bill did, however, see the light of day in 2008, 
and was placed in the public domain by the Department of Home Affairs for comments, 
with submissions being called for by 15 February 2008.  De Vos412 criticises the Draft 
Bill in that it was tabled without the provision which had been stipulated in the Civil 
Union Bill.413 Instead, the Draft Bill distinguishes between registered partnerships and 
unregistered partnerships, and it seems as if the authors of the Draft Bill ‘rely heavily on 
the agency of individual partners or - where that fails - on the court to protect the 
marginalised and vulnerable’.414 
 
2  Purpose of Draft Bill 
The purpose of this Bill is to provide for the legal recognition of domestic partnerships, to 
enforce the legal consequences of domestic partnerships, and also to provide details on 
matters incidental to domestic partnerships.415 
 
3  Preamble of Draft Bill 
The Preamble of the Draft Bill refers to section 9(1) of the Constitution,416  which states 
that ‘everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law’, despite the fact that heterosexual cohabitees have no protection when he or she 
finds him or herself in a permanent domestic partnership.  The Alliance for the Legal 
Recognition of Domestic Partnerships (hereinafter ‘the Alliance’) recommended a more 
detailed Preamble which outlines the rationale behind the right to equality and dignity.417  
                                                 
410  Goldblatt (2008) at 8. 
411   The Alliance (2008) at 1-2. 
412   De Vos (2008) at p134. 
413   Civil Union Bill, 2006 . 
414   De Vos  (2008) at 134. 
415   Draft  Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
416   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
417   The Alliance (2008) at 4. 
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The Alliance further requested the deletion of the term ‘opposite sex’, as it was 
discriminatory in that it excluded same-sex couples from benefiting under the Act.418 
4  Definitions in Draft Bill 
The Draft Bill defines ‘domestic partnership’ to mean ‘a registered domestic partnership 
or unregistered domestic partnership between two persons who are both 18 years of age 
or older, and includes a former domestic partnerships’.  The Alliance supports the 
definition of ‘child of domestic partnership’419 which  I also support, because the status of 
the child automatically changes, that is, from a child born out of wedlock to a legitimate 
child.  I also share the Alliance’s sentiments that the term ‘duty of support’ should have 
the same meaning as the one provided for in Common law.420  The Alliance rightfully 
argues that the term ‘pet’ should be replaced with ‘animals’, because what could happen 
when the one partner owned a horse or chickens, etc.421.  The Alliance recommends that 
the definition of ‘court’ should be broadened to include magistrates’ courts, and rightfully 
also points out that the definition of ‘family’ should be deleted.422 What is also important 
is that we have at present a Draft Bill, and that, when the final Bill is passed, the 
Constitutional Court could decide on the constitutionality of the Act’s provisions.   
 
5 Objectives of Draft Bill 
The Draft Bill aims to guarantee the rights of equality and the dignity of cohabitees.  The 
aim is also to reform family law to be in compliance with the applicable provisions 
contained in the Draft Bill of Rights, through the-  
‘ (a)  recognition of the legal status of domestic partners;  
(b)  regulation of the rights and obligations of domestic partners;  
(c)  protection of the interests of both domestic partners and interested parties on the 
termination of domestic partnerships; and 
(d)  final determination of the financial relationships between domestic partners and 
interested parties when domestic partnerships terminate’.423 
                                                 
418   The Alliance (2008) at 4. 
419  The Alliance (2008) at  4. 
420  The Alliance (2008) at 5. 
421  The Alliance (2008) at 5. 
422  The Alliance (2008) at 5. 
423  Draft Domestic Partnerships  Bill (2008) at clause 2. 
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The Alliance does not support the objectives of the Draft Bill, since it merely refers to the 
children of domestic partnerships. It should also have included the protection of children 
as part of its objectives as well.424     
 
6  Requirements for registered domestic partnerships 
The Draft Bill distinguishes between registered domestic partnerships425 and unregistered 
domestic partnerships.426  The Alliance welcomes the introduction of registered domestic 
partnerships since more options are created in order for couples to choose how their 
relationship should be regulated.427 Unlike civil unions, civil marriages and Customary 
marriages which are by default in community of property if no antenuptial contract is 
concluded, a couple may enter into a registered domestic partnership which has lesser 
cumbersome registration requirements.428 As in the case of marriage, a cohabitee may 
only be a partner in one registered domestic partnership at any given time.429 If one of the 
partners, or both, were previously married or a partner to any union, then documentary 
proof of a divorce order, or death certificate of the former spouse or partner, or a 
termination certificate430 must be submitted to the registration officer before the 
registration of a domestic partnership can take effect.  Unlike in the case of a marriage, 
the Minister, or any officer in the public service authorised by the Minister, may appoint 
a registration officer to register the domestic partnership after the parties have declared in 
writing their willingness to register their domestic partnership.431  
 
As with a marriage, the declaration of the two domestic partners must be made in the 
presence of the registration officer, and the registration officer will then issue a 
registration certificate.  The domestic partnership can only be registered if one of the 
                                                 
424   The Alliance (2008)  at 7. 
425   Clause 4. 
426   Clause 26. 
427   The Alliance (2008) at 7. 
428   The Alliance (2008) at 7. 
429   Clause 4(1). 
430   Clause  4(3). 
431   Clauses 5 and 6. 
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parties to the relationship is a South African citizen.432  De Vos433 is of the opinion that 
clause 26(5) of the Draft Bill is discriminatory in that it provides no protection unless one 
of the partners is a South African.  De Vos434 also opines that clause 26(5) is problematic 
in that it implies that ‘woman refugees, undocumented immigrants or even permanent 
residents’ are not entitled to protection when they choose to enter into a domestic 
partnership with another ‘refugee, undocumented immigrant or permanent resident’.  The 
Alliance shares this sentiment to the extent that the Draft Bill ignores the fact that many 
of the people who are not South African citizens, are usually those who find themselves 
in domestic partnerships.435 The Alliance436 submits that section 8 of the Civil Union 
Act437 and section 3(2) of the RCMA438 should be amended to include a reference to 
registered domestic partnerships. The Draft Bill sets out that both parties must be 18 
years old or older if they intend having their relationship registered as a domestic 
partnership.439  In the case of marriage, a person under the age of 18 may conclude a 
marriage if both parents consent to the marriage.  In addition, however, when a boy is 
below the age of 18 years and a girl below the age of 15 years, the Minister of Home 
Affairs must grant written permission if he or she considers the marriage to be 
desirable.440  The Draft Bill is silent in respect of minors, prodigals, mentally ill persons 
and partners who have been placed under curatorship, and who wish to register a 
domestic partnership.  
 
As in the case of marriage, the registration officer submits the registration register to the 
officer in the public service who is responsible for the population register in his or her 
area of responsibility.  The officer in the public service will then include the particulars of 
the registered domestic partnership in the population register, as prescribed by the 
provisions of section 8(e) of the Identification Act.441 
                                                 
432   Clause 4(6). 
433   De Vos  (2008) at 137.  
434   De Vos (2008) at 137. 
435   The Alliance (2008) at 8. 
436   The Alliance (2008) at 8. 
437   Civil Union Act, 2006. 
438   RCMA, 1998 
439   Clause 6(1). 
440   Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 20-21. 
441   Identification Act, 1997. 
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6.1 Property regime 
The Alliance proposes that clause 7(2) of the Draft Bill should be amended so as to refer 
to clauses 22 and 21.442  
 
As with a marriage, where the parties to the marriage are issued with a marriage 
certificate, the parties to the registered domestic partnership are issued with a registration 
certificate.  Similarly to a marriage with an antenuptial contract, the Draft Bill also makes 
provision for the parties to enter into a further agreement which regulates their financial 
affairs. The registered domestic partnership agreement must also be attached to the 
registration certificate.443 
 
The law presumes that all marriages are in community of property. However, no general 
community of property exists between the parties in a registered domestic partnership.  
As stated earlier, the Draft Bill provides for the partners to conclude a registered 
domestic partnership agreement.444 In the absence of such a registered partnership 
agreement,445 any other agreement concluded between the two partners will only bind 
them to the agreement.446  
 
De Vos447 points out that even though a domestic partnership agreement was registered, a 
court still has the discretion to set aside the agreement if such agreement could result in 
serious injustice to any of the partners.  The court thus has to consider the following448:  
‘ (a)  the terms of the registered domestic partnership agreement;  
(b)  the time that has elapsed since the registered domestic partnership agreement 
was concluded;  
                                                 
442  The Alliance (2008) at 8. 
443  Clause 6(6). 
444  Clause 7(3). 
445 In terms of clause 6(8), a registration officer had to keep a record of all registrations of domestic 
partnerships he or she had conducted and also had to indicate in the register that a registered domestic 
partnership agreement did exist and had to attach a copy to the registration certificate. 
446  Clause 7(4). 
447  De Vos (2008) at 134 
448  Clause 8(3). 
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(c)  whether the registered domestic partnership agreement was unfair or 
unreasonable in the light of all circumstances at the time it was made;  
(d)  whether the registered domestic partnership agreement has become unfair or 
unreasonable in the light of any changes in circumstances since it was made and 
whether those changes were foreseen by the parties or not;  
(e) the fact that the parties wished to achieve certainty as to the status, ownership 
and division of property by entering into the registered domestic partnership 
agreement;  
(f) the contributions of the parties to the registered domestic partnership;  
      and 
(g) any other matter that the court considers relevant’.449 
 
As in the case of marriage, where a valid antenuptial contract determines the property 
division of the spouses,450 a court, in terms of the Draft Bill, may also decide on any 
matter with regard to a registered domestic partnership agreement based on the principles 
of the law of contract.451  
 
7  Legal consequences of registered domestic partnerships 
With regard to the status of the parties, the Draft Bill does not specify whether the 
parties’ status changes upon registering the domestic partnership, as in the case of a 
marriage.  However, the Draft Bill is clear in stating that any party who is married under 
the Marriage Act,452 married in compliance with the RCMA,453 or a spouse or a partner in 
a civil union, may not register a domestic partnership.454 
 
If a potential partner was previously married, whether under the Marriage Act455 or the 
RCMA,456 or was a partner in a civil union partnership under the Civil Union Act,457 or a 
                                                 
449  Clause 8(3). 
450  Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 70. 
451  Clause 8(5). 
452  Marriage Act, 1961. 
453  RCMA, 1998. 
454  Clause 4(2). 
455  Marriage Act, 1961. 
456  RCMA, 1998. 
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partner in a registered domestic partnership as specified in the Draft Bill, he or she must 
provide a certified copy of the divorce order, or a death certificate of the former spouse or 
partner, or a termination certificate, where applicable.  The certified copy will serve as 
proof that the former marriage, civil union or registered domestic partnership, had been 
legally terminated.458 This is the same as in the case of marriage. 
 
One of the invariable consequences of a marriage is that it automatically gives rise to a 
reciprocal duty of support.459 In the Draft Bill, too, the registered domestic partners are 
required to maintain one another, in accordance with their respective financial means and 
needs,460 and the Alliance welcomes the recognition of a duty of support.461 
 
The children of a marriage are regarded as legitimate, and both parents have legal rights 
and responsibilities in respect of the child.  The Draft Bill also makes provision that, 
when a child is born into a registered domestic partnership between a heterosexual 
couple, the male partner is deemed to be the biological father of that child.  Similar rights 
and responsibilities are conferred upon him as in the case of his male counterpart in a 
marriage.462 The Alliance urges that this section must be removed because the rights of 
fathers are already covered in the Children’s Act463.   
 
With regard to the occupation of the family home, both domestic partners are entitled to 
live there during the existence of the registered domestic partnership.  As in the case of a 
marriage, it does not matter who owns or rents the property.464 However, the owning or 
renting registered partner may not eject the other registered partner from the family home 
during the existence of the registered domestic partnership.465  As with a marriage in 
community of property, the partner in a registered domestic partnership may not, without 
                                                                                                                                                 
457  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
458  Clause 4(3). 
459  Cronjé and Heaton (2004) at 40. 
460  Clause 9. 
461  The Alliance (2008). at 8. 
462  Clause 17. 
463  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
464  Clause 11(1). 
465  Clause 11(2). 
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the written consent of the other registered partner, sell, donate, mortgage, let, lease or 
dispose of the joint property.466 The Alliance welcomes this clause, as well as clause 
11(2)467 which states: ‘The registered partner who owns or rents the family home may not 
evict the other registered partner from the family home during the existence of the 
registered domestic partnership’. 
 
8 Termination of registered domestic partnerships 
Termination of the registered domestic partnership is both similar to, and different from, 
the termination of a marriage. As is the case of a marriage, the registered domestic 
partnership can be dissolved by death of one, or both, registered domestic partners,468 or 
by a court order.469 The difference is that the registered domestic partners may conclude a 
termination agreement, in order to regulate the financial consequences of the termination 
of their registered domestic partnership.470 The Alliance does not support this provision, 
and recommends that it will be in the interest of both registered domestic partners if the 
dissolution of their registered domestic partnership takes effect through a court order.  
The Alliance recommends that the court order enables the partners to enforce their 
termination agreement much easier,471 and the Draft Bill should correspond with the 
intention of the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Bill.472 I support the 
Alliance’s473 view that it would be practical to consider the inclusion of sections similar 
to sections 8 (rescission, suspension or variation of orders), 10 (costs) and 12 (limitation 
of publication of particulars of divorce action) of the Divorce Act.474 I am also of the 
opinion that one party may, for some or other reason, be reluctant to execute his or her 
part of the agreement, and the other party will be compelled to approach a court for 
                                                 
466  Clause 10. 
467  The Alliance (2008) at 8. 
468  Clause 12(1)(a). 
469  Clause 15(1). 
470  Clause 14(1). 
471  The Alliance (2008) at 9. 
472 The Alliance (2008) at 9. The purpose of this Amendment Bill is to ‘enhance access to justice by 
conferring jurisdiction on courts for regional divisions which are distributed throughout the national 
territory to deal with civil matters …’. 
473  The Alliance (2008) at 9. 
474  Divorce Act, 1979. 
 
 
 
 
 73
assistance.475  The Draft Bill specifies that the termination agreement must be in writing, 
must be signed by both registered domestic partners, and both registered domestic 
partners must declare that they have entered into the agreement without duress.476 The 
termination agreement may provide for-  
 ‘(a)   the division of joint and separate property;  
  (b) the payment of maintenance to the other registered domestic partner; 
arrangements regarding the family home;  and 
(c)  any other matter relevant to the financial consequences of the termination of the 
registered domestic partnership’.477 
 
The termination by a court order only applies where there are minor children born into 
the relationship. The registered domestic partners who have minor children, and who 
intend to terminate the registered domestic partnership, are compelled to make an 
application to a court for the termination order.478 The application to a court must be 
made in compliance with the provisions of the Supreme Court Act.479 The Alliance 
contends that specific reference to the High Court places limitations on access to justice, 
especially in the case of vulnerable women.480 One should also look at costs, because not 
everybody can afford to institute legal action. In approaching the High Court, the 
termination takes the same route as a divorce order.  De Vos481 raises an interesting 
question: what happens if there are no minor children, and one of the partners requests 
termination and the other party refuses. De Vos recommends, and I support the 
recommendation, that the Draft Bill should have made provision for such a situation.482 
The court takes cognisance of the welfare of minor children, and will only make an order 
which is in the best interests of a child.  The same approach applies to the dissolution of a 
marriage.483 The court will go to the extent of appointing a legal practitioner to act on 
                                                 
475  The Alliance (2008) at 9. 
476  Clause 14(2). 
477  Clause 14(3) read with clause 12(1) (b). 
478  Clause 15(1). 
479  Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 read with clause 15(2) of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
480  The Alliance (2008) at 9. 
481  De Vos (2008) at 136. 
482  De Vos (2008) at 136. 
483  Clause 16(1). 
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behalf of the child during the proceedings, and both registered partners may be held liable 
to pay the costs of such legal representation.484  I support the view of the Alliance that 
clause 16(5)(b) of the Draft Bill should be amended in accordance with the new 
terminology of the Children’s Act 78 of 2005.485  Clause 17 of the Draft Bill deals with 
the rights of the male partner as the biological father of the children born into that 
relationship, and the Alliance rightfully request the deletion of this section since the 
rights of fathers are adequately dealt with in the Children’s Act.486 
 
After the termination of a registered domestic partnership, the court may, as with the 
dissolution of a marriage do make the following.  It can set out a maintenance order, 
which is just and equitable, in respect of payment of maintenance by one registered 
domestic partner to the other partner for a specified period or until the other partner dies, 
marries, enters into a civil union or enters into another registered domestic partnership.487  
The court will also consider certain factors before ordering the payment of maintenance, 
and the amount and nature of such maintenance.  Such factors will include-  
‘(a) the respective contributions of each partner to the registered domestic 
partnership;  
 (b)   the existence and prospective means of each of the registered domestic partners; 
(c)  the respective earning capacities, future financial needs and obligations of each 
of the registered partners;  
(d)  the age of the registered partners;  
(e) the duration of the registered domestic partnership;  
(f) the standard of living of the registered domestic partners prior to the termination 
of the registered domestic partnership; and  
(g) any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into 
account’.488   
 
                                                 
484  Clause 16(7). 
485  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
486  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
487  Clauses 18(1). 
488  Clauses 18(2). 
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The Alliance supports this clause as well as clauses 19 and 20 of the Draft Bill.489 
Another advantage of the Draft Bill is that it makes provision that any reference to 
“spouse” in the MOSSA490 and in the ISA491 must be construed as including a registered 
domestic partner.492 I support the view of De Vos,493 that the Draft Bill partially remedies 
the injustice inflicted upon Mrs Robinson in the Volks case,494 because, in effect, it will, 
after its enactment, contribute to the amendment of the MOSSA495 which will then state 
that ‘spouse’ in that Act will also include a registered domestic partner. 
 
A court may consider some of the above factors in its decision to make a maintenance 
order after the termination of a marriage.496 The Draft Bill also granted rights for the 
purpose of claiming damages in a delictual claim, in a case where one of the partners in a 
registered domestic partnership is killed by a third party in a wrongful and culpable 
manner.497 The Alliance proposes a more positive phrasing for clause 21(2), namely that 
‘A partner in a registered domestic partnership may institute a delictual claim for 
damages based on the wrongful death of the other partner’.  The Alliance498 also requests 
that clause 21(3) should be re-phrased accordingly since the clause only refers to COIDA, 
and yet there are quite a number of laws in which the partner is, or should be, recognized 
as a dependant. I find it unnecessary that both clauses should be re-phrased499  The 
Alliance is also of the opinion that the Draft Bill should not only regulate domestic 
partnerships which have ended, but should also provide some legal protection to domestic 
partners during their partnership.500 
 
                                                 
489  The Alliance (2008) at 10. Clause 19 states that ‘… a reference to “spouse” in the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act must be construed as to include a registered domestic partner,’ and section 20 states 
that ‘ … a reference to “spouse” in the Intestate Succession Act must be construed to include a registered 
domestic partner’. 
490   MOSSA , 1990. 
491   ISA, 1987. 
492  Clauses 19 and  20. 
493  De Vos (2008) at 136. 
494  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
495  MOSSA , 1990. 
496  Cronjé and Heaton  (2004) at 147-148. 
497  Clause 21. 
498  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
499  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
500  The Alliance (2008) at 7. 
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8.1  Property division after  termination of  registered domestic partnerships 
When a dispute arises with regard to the division of property after the dissolution of a 
registered domestic partnership, then one or both of the registered domestic partners who 
dispute the division of property, may apply to a court for an order to divide their joint or 
separate property, as the court may deem fit.501  The court will make an order which is 
just and equitable, after taking all relevant factors into consideration.502 The court may 
also make an order, which is just and equitable, in a case where an application had been 
for the division of their separate property, and also to have the property transferred from 
one registered domestic partner to the other partner.503 De Vos correctly states that this 
clause seeks to address the imbalances in many relationships, where women mainly 
perform the chores in the relationship without being remunerated.504 
 
When granting an order upon the application for the division of joint or separate property, 
the court must take into account-  
‘(a)  the existing means and obligations of the registered domestic partners;  
(b)  any donation made by one of the registered domestic partners to the other during 
the subsistence of the registered domestic partnership;  
(c)  the circumstances of the registered domestic partnership;  
(d) the vested rights of interested parties in the joint and separate property of the 
registered domestic partners;  
(e) the existence and terms of a registered domestic partnerships agreement, if any, 
between the registered domestic partners; and  
(f) any other relevant factors’.505 
 
The Alliance welcomes the reference to both joint and separate property in clause 22 
because it gives recognition to the partner who made contributions to the separate 
property of the other partner.506 
                                                 
501  Clause 22(1).  This section is erroneously referred to in clause 7(2) as clause 21. 
502  Clause 22(2). 
503  Clause 22(3). 
504  De Vos (2008) at 135. 
505  Clause 22(4). 
506  The Alliance (2008) at 10. 
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Before granting an order as contemplated in clause 22(3) of the Draft Bill,507  the court 
must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, in that the applicant contributed 
directly or indirectly to the maintenance, or the increase, of the separate property or part 
of the separate property, of the respondent, during the existence of the registered 
domestic partnership.508 De Vos509 defines ‘contribution’ to include the contribution 
made in the capacity as a parent which was in the interest of the other party or the family 
as a whole.  The Alliance510 also supports the broad definition of ‘contribution’ in the 
Draft Bill because it reflects a growing perception by the courts, and the public at large, 
of value that is created by partners, specifically women, who care for families and 
children. 
 
A party who wishes to make an application to a court for an order under clause 22 of the 
Draft Bill, must do so within two years after the termination of the registered domestic 
partnership.511 The Alliance raises a concern with regard to this requirement, because the 
same condition is not applicable to divorces in respect of civil marriages, civil unions or 
Customary marriages.512 The Draft Bill requires both registered partners to give written 
notice of the registered domestic partnership’s termination to interested parties.513 The 
Alliance opposes this clause by claiming that it would result in a cumbersome process, 
especially if one partner is unaware of the other partner’s financial affairs.514 The Draft 
Bill states that ‘when a registered domestic partnership is terminated, both registered 
partners are liable to give written notice of the termination to interested parties’.515  In the 
event of the death of one or both of the registered domestic partners, the surviving 
registered partner or the executor of the estate of either registered domestic partner, will 
                                                 
507  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
508  Clause 22(5). 
509  De Vos (2008) at 135. 
510  The Alliance (2008) at 4-5. 
511  Clause 23(1).  Clause 21 in this section must be replaced with Clause 22.  The same applies to clause 25 
of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill. 
512  The Alliance (2008) at 11. 
513  Clause 24(1). 
514  The Alliance (2008) at 11. 
515  Clause 24(1). 
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be obliged to give written notice of the termination of the registered domestic partnership 
to all interested parties.516  
 
The Draft Bill is explicitly clear with regard to the termination of registered domestic 
partnerships by death and the registration of a termination agreement.  Unlike the position 
which exists in a marriage, the Draft Bill is silent on what would happen in the event of 
one partner who wishes to terminate, while the other partner refuses to conclude a 
termination agreement.  
 
9 Maintenance and property division after termination of unregistered domestic 
partnerships 
The Draft Bill not only provides protection for registered domestic partnerships, but also 
for unregistered domestic partnerships.  In this instance, one or both unregistered 
domestic partners may, after the dissolution of the unregistered domestic partnership 
through either death or separation, apply to a court for a maintenance order, an intestate 
succession order, or a property division order.517 The Alliance rejects the phrase ‘after the 
unregistered domestic partnership has ended through death or separation’, and requests 
the deletion of clause 26(1), so that a person can approach a court during the subsistence 
of the partnership to claim relief.518 A court will, however, decide whether a partnership 
is entitled to protection519 considering all the circumstances of the relationship, including-  
‘(a)  the duration and nature of the relationship;  
(b) the nature and extent of Common residence;  
(c) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any arrangements for 
financial support, between the unregistered domestic partners; 
(d) the ownership, use and acquisition of property;  
(e) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;  
(f) the care and support of children of the unregistered domestic partnership;  
(g) the performance of household duties;  
                                                 
516  Clause 24(2). 
517  Clause 26(1). 
518  The Alliance (2008) at 13. 
519  De Vos (2008) at 138. 
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(h) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship;  and 
(i) the relationship status of the unregistered domestic partners with third parties’.520 
 
De Vos521 is of the opinion that, despite the protection the Draft Bill purports to provide, 
the protection is not automatic.  The Draft Bill in essence provides for a threshold test 
before legal protection for unregistered partners takes effect.  De Vos522  rightfully avers 
that the marginalised partner in an unregistered domestic partnership has to cross a 
number of hurdles in order to be entitled to protection.  One hurdle, for instance, is proof 
that the partnership is of such a nature that it is entitled to legal protection. The SALRC 
recommended that the threshold question should be: whether the partners have lived as a 
couple.523 The SALRC correctly proposes that, when the court is satisfied that the parties 
lived as a couple, then it can be accepted that there was a mutual commitment.524 The 
SALRC525 also proposed two alternative options which could regulate unmarried and 
unregistered family partnerships.  The first alternative is referred to as the de facto option, 
but should not be confused with the term “de facto relationship” of the NSW legislation.  
The second alternative is referred to as the ex post facto option.  The former option refers 
to a ‘ascription’ model which creates rights and obligations for a couple in an intimate 
relationship during the existence of the unregistered relationship; and the latter option 
refers to the judicial discretion model which allows partners in former relationships to 
apply to the court for property division or maintenance in the event that the partners 
cannot reach agreement after the termination of their relationship. The SALRC 
recommended that legislation should automatically apply to both options.526 This would 
have created an ideal opportunity for unregistered domestic partners whose relationship 
has ended to be entitled to an automatic right to legal protection, and to apply to a court 
for property division or maintenance. 
 
                                                 
520  Clause 26(2). 
521  De Vos (2008) at 137. 
522  De Vos (2008) at 136. 
523  SALRC (2006) at 393. 
524  SALRC (2006) at 393. 
525  SALRC (2006) at 369. 
526  SALRC (2006) at 370. 
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In terms of the Draft Bill, a court will not make an order regarding the relationship of a 
partner who, at the time of the relationship, was also a spouse in a civil marriage, or a 
partner in a civil union or a registered domestic partnership, with a third party.527 This 
provision appears to be discriminatory, according to De Vos, who presumes that men in 
Customary marriages will be more likely to enter into unregistered domestic 
partnerships.528 The Alliance529 is of the opinion that the clause should be removed and 
replaced with one that allows courts to grant an order not only in respect of unregistered 
domestic partnerships that co-exist with a Customary marriage, but also where another 
type of union exists.  De Vos530 argues that clause 26(5) may not pass constitutional 
scrutiny. I support the views of both the Alliance and De Vos that the law condones that 
an unregistered domestic partnership co-exists with a Customary union, but not with a 
civil marriage, civil union or registered domestic partnership.  De Vos531 argues further 
that men in Customary marriages are now allowed to have intimate partners as well as 
their traditional Customary spouses. De Vos532  raises an interesting point: that women 
who enter into an unregistered domestic partnership with men who are married in terms 
of the Marriage Act533 or the Civil Union Act,534 will find no protection in law because 
they will not be viewed as being part of the vulnerable people in society. 
 
De Vos535 relied on Constitutional Court decisions536 which, he claimed, categorically 
state that different treatment by law of at least permanent residents can constitute unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution537. 
 
9.1 Maintenance after termination of unregistered domestic partnerships 
                                                 
527  Clause 26(4). 
528  De Vos (2008) at 137. 
529  The Alliance (2008) at 11. 
530  De Vos (2008) at 137. 
531  De Vos (2008) at 141. 
532  De Vos (2008) at 137. 
533  Marriage Act, 1961. 
534  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
535  De Vos (2008) at 137. 
536  See Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (4) SA 197 (B). 
537  Constitution, 1996. 
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Unregistered domestic partners are not liable to maintain each other, and neither party is 
entitled to claim maintenance from the other, except as provided for in the Draft Bill.  
The Draft Bill makes provision for two types of maintenance orders.538  The Alliance 
proposes the deletion of clause 27, and that that clause should be replaced with the 
wording of clause 9 in the Draft Bill.539 
 
9.1.1 Maintenance order after separation of unregistered domestic partners 
In this instance, the court may, upon application of one or both partners in an 
unregistered domestic partnership, make an order which is just and equitable in respect of 
the payment of maintenance by one unregistered domestic partner to the other, for a 
specified period.540 The court, when deciding whether to order the payment of 
maintenance, and the amount and nature of such maintenance, must consider all relevant 
matters including-  
‘(a)  the age of the unregistered domestic partners;  
(b) the duration of the unregistered domestic partnership;  
(c) the standard of living of the unregistered domestic partners prior to the 
separation; 
(d) the ability of the applicant to support him or herself adequately, in view of him 
or her having custody of a minor child of the unregistered domestic partnership;  
(e) the respective contributions of each unregistered domestic partner to the 
unregistered domestic partnership;  
(f) the existing and prospective means of each unregistered domestic partner;  
(g) the respective earning capacities, future financial needs and obligations of each 
unregistered domestic partner; and  
(h) the relevant circumstances of another unregistered domestic partnership or 
Customary marriage of one or both unregistered domestic partners, where 
applicable, insofar as they are connected to the existence and circumstances of 
                                                 
538  Clause 27. See also De Vos (2008) at 138. 
539  The Alliance (2008) at 13. 
540  Clause 28(1). 
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the unregistered domestic partnership, and any other factor which, in the opinion 
of the court, should be taken into account’.541 
 
9.1.2 Maintenance order after death of unregistered domestic partners 
The Alliance correctly states that the appropriate heading under Part 11 of the Draft Bill 
should read ‘Maintenance with respect to an unregistered domestic partnership’ and not 
‘Maintenance after termination of unregistered domestic partnership’.542 The Alliance 
also recommends that the heading above clause 28 of the Draft Bill should read 
‘Application for maintenance order’ and not ‘Application for maintenance order after 
separation’.543  The Alliance recommends further that clause 9, which extends the duty of 
support to registered partners, should also apply to unregistered domestic partners.544 
 
When one of the unregistered domestic partners dies, the surviving partner is entitled to 
make an application to a court for an order for the payment of reasonable maintenance 
from the deceased’s estate until his or her death, remarriage, or the registration of another 
registered domestic partnership.545  The provisions of the Administration of Estates Act546 
apply in the event of an application to a court for the payment of maintenance.547 The 
Alliance548 does not support clause 29(3)(c) because it refers to competing claims 
between the surviving unregistered domestic partner and the surviving Customary 
spouse.  I agree with the Alliance that clause 29(3(c) constitutes unfair discrimination, 
and that the word ‘Customary’ should be removed, and the words ‘or partner or spouse in 
a civil union, or registered domestic partnership’ should be added after the word 
‘spouse’.549 
 
                                                 
541  Clause 28(2). 
542  The Alliance (2008) at 13. 
543  The Alliance (2008) at 13. 
544  The Alliance (2008) at 12. 
545  Clause 29(1). 
546  Administration of Estates Act, 1965. 
547  Clauses 29(2) and (3). 
548  The Alliance (2008) at 12. 
549  The Alliance (2008) at 12. 
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The court may consider the following circumstances when determining the reasonable 
maintenance needs of a surviving unregistered domestic partner-  
‘(a)  the amount in the estate of the deceased available for distribution to heirs and 
legatees; 
 (b) the existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and 
obligations of the surviving unregistered domestic partner; 
 (c)  the standard of living of the surviving unregistered domestic partner during the 
subsistence of the unregistered domestic partnership and his or her age at the time of 
death of the deceased; 
 (d) the existence and circumstances of multiple relationships between the deceased 
and an unregistered domestic partner, and between the deceased and a Customary 
spouse; and 
 (e)  any other factor that it regards relevant’.550   
 
The Alliance recommends the amendment of clause 30(d) of the Draft Bill: that the term 
‘Customary spouse’ should be deleted and replaced with the words ‘spouse, partner or 
spouse in a civil union or a registered domestic partner’.551 The same proposal applies to 
clause 31(3) of the Draft Bill. 
 
The surviving unregistered domestic partner may also bring an application to court for an 
order that he or she may inherit intestate, subject to two provisions.552  In terms of the 
first provision,553 it is stated that ‘where the deceased is survived by an unregistered 
domestic partner as well as a descendant, such unregistered domestic partner inherits a 
child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in 
value the amount fixed from time to time by the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of Justice by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the greater, as provided 
for in the Intestate Succession Act’.554  
 
                                                 
550  Clause 30. See also De Vos (2008) at 139. 
551  The Alliance (2008) at 12. 
552  Clause 31(1). See also De Vos (2008) at 139. 
553  Clause 31(2). 
554  ISA, 1987. 
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The second provision555 provides that, in the event of a dispute between the surviving 
unregistered domestic partner and the Customary spouse of a deceased partner regarding 
the benefits to be awarded, the court may once again make an order which is just and 
equitable having regard to all relevant circumstances of both relationships. 
 
9.2 Property division after termination of unregistered domestic partnerships 
If there is no agreement between the unregistered domestic partners, one, or both of them, 
may apply to court for an order to divide their joint or separate property.556 The court will 
make an order it deems just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, also 
after taking into account-557 
‘(a)  the existing means and obligations of the unregistered domestic partners; 
(b) any donation made by one unregistered domestic partner to the other during the 
subsistence of the unregistered domestic partnership; 
(c) the circumstances of the unregistered domestic partnership; the vested rights and 
interested parties in the joint and separate property of the unregistered domestic 
partnership; and 
(d) any other relevant factors’. 
 
The Alliance requests that a further factor  be added, viz, ‘the needs and interests of any 
child or children of the domestic partnership’.558 
 
According to De Vos,559  before a court decides transfer to property of one party to 
another, the court must be satisfied that the beneficiary contributed directly or indirectly 
to the maintenance or increase of the separate property.  He further proposed that 
‘contribution’ should be defined as including ‘financial and non-financial contributions 
made directly or indirectly by the domestic partners’560 to the improvement of the joint 
property or the separate property of either domestic partner.    
                                                 
555  Clause 31(3). 
556  Clause 32(1). 
557  De Vos (2008) at 140. 
558  The Alliance (2008) at 14. 
559  Clause 32(4). 
560  Clause 1. 
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An application for a court order in terms of clause 32 must be made within two years 
after the date on which an unregistered domestic partnership has terminated through 
separation or death.561  The Alliance correctly points out that the references to clause 31 
in clauses 33(1) and (2) were errors which have to be replaced with references to clause 
32.  According to the Alliance, the two years’ application period will limit access to the 
courts, especially for vulnerable partners whom the Draft Bill purports to protect.562 
 
10  Conclusion 
It is evident that Mrs Robinson in Volks v Robinson563 would have been protected by the 
Draft Bill. However, other female cohabitees who enter into domestic partnerships with 
men, and who are simultaneously married in terms of the Marriage Act564 or Civil Union 
Act565, will not find protection under this Bill.566  De Vos567 rightly raises concern for 
women who find themselves in relationships with men who had already entered into a 
Customary marriage with someone else. Will these women be able to convince a court 
that their relationship is worthy of protection?  He avers further that such relationships 
may not contain most of the characteristics that the Draft Bill requires in order to be 
entitled to protection.568  
 
Despite the minimum protection that the Draft Bill provides, it is still caught up in a 
traditionalist paradigm based on the fiction that every individual is capable of making 
their own decisions with regard to their affairs569. The choice will still rest with them to 
make the right decision with regard to their relationships. The CALS also conducted 
research which showed that women who find themselves in a domestic partnership are 
unable to convince their partners to marry them.570 
                                                 
561  Clause 33(1). 
562  The Alliance (2008) at 13. 
563  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
564  Marriage  Act, 1961. 
565  Civil Union Act, 2006. 
566  De Vos (2008) at 138. 
567  De Vos (2008) at 138. 
568  De Vos (2008) at 138. 
569  De Vos (2008) at 140. 
570  Centre for Applied Legal Studies (2006) at 3. 
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The Draft Bill provides some protection to cohabitees.  However, I agree with De Vos571 
that, to some extent, the Draft Bill raises more questions than supplying answers.  De 
Vos572 questions the assumption that individuals whose relationships have terminated are 
able to engage with the courts.  He describes this assumption as a fiction that is deeply 
rooted in the traditional South African legal culture.  He questions 573 how a poor and 
marginalised woman whose domestic partnership has ended will be able to rely on the 
Draft Bill for protection, and how the court will deal with the numerous types of 
relationships which do not comply with the traditional patriarchally inspired nuclear 
model of relationships and family life.  The Alliance questions the limited legal 
protection afforded to domestic partnerships in South Africa.  The limited protection 
leaves vulnerable partners, mostly women, penniless and without recourse when these 
relationships end.574 
 
Finally, De Vos575 questions whether the Draft Bill would be able to remedy the hardship 
faced by women who find themselves in either a registered domestic partnership or an 
unregistered domestic partnership.  The Alliance poses the question whether we should 
leave a woman who finds herself in a domestic partnership, destitute, without rights or 
recourse. The Alliance rightfully argues that it is very often the male partner in a 
domestic partnership who created the relationship of dependency and who is the one who 
married someone else without telling the female partner in the domestic partnership.576   
 
It is also unacceptable that the Draft Bill contains an arbitrary distinction between 
marriages in terms of the Marriage Act577 or the Civil Union Act578 and the RCMA579.  
The Alliance supports this view, and questions the fact that the co-existence of a marriage 
                                                 
571   De Vos (2008) at 141. 
572   De Vos (2008) at 141. 
573   De Vos (2008) at 141. 
574   The Alliance (2008) at 2. 
575   De Vos (2008) at 133-134. 
576   The Alliance (2008) at 11. 
577   Marriage Act, 1961. 
578   Civil Union Act, 2006. 
579   RCMA, 1998. 
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should be adequate in preventing any other form of protection to those in domestic 
partnerships.580  
 
De Vos581 contends that this distinction questions the assumption of the Draft Bill that 
men in a Customary marriage are allowed to enter into an unregistered domestic 
partnership with someone other than their spouses.   
 
I agree with De Vos582 that constitutional law is tainted with ‘traditional’ Common law 
rules.  He correctly says that this averment is based on the notion that the Bill of Rights 
protects the individual, in that every individual has the freedom to make choices and to 
decide how they want to live their lives.   De Vos583 recommends that, for the purpose of 
transformation, the Constitution should review the Common law assumption that every 
citizen is free to decide how they arrange their affairs.  It is especially the women who 
suffer and, together with De Vos I subscribe to the view that, due to patriarchy, women 
lack the negotiating power to choose to either enter into an intimate relationship, or not.  
 
How will the Legislature be able to determine whether a relationship was indeed a 
domestic partnership, especially an unregistered one.  The Alliance proposes that 
legislation should address the problem of the unequal position of poor women in 
domestic partnerships, whether registered or unregistered.584 The Draft Bill is silent with 
regard to the duration of a domestic partnership, and I agree with the recommendation of 
the SALRC that it may create problems to determine the actual starting and end dates of a 
relationship.  The SALRC poses the question: what would happen if one partner dies just 
before the minimum period runs out?585  It actually became a rhetorical question, since 
this requirement was subsequently rejected.  
 
                                                 
580   The Alliance (2008) at 11. 
581   De Vos (2008) at 141. 
582   De Vos (2008) at 131. 
583   De Vos (2008) at 131. 
584   The Alliance (2008). 
585   SALRC (2006) at 393. 
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The Alliance also recommends that the Draft Bill should allow parties to register their 
domestic partnership after they have been in that partnership for a number of years.  The 
Draft Bill should take into account that the parties have made financial contributions, and 
that it is their choice to decide when to register their domestic partnership.586 
 
I trust that a final Bill will be tabled soon for Parliament’s approval.  Parliament has a 
duty towards every citizen in South Africa.  Until then, women’s groups and Human 
Rights organizations deserve to be supported in their quest for change. 
 
I, therefore, urge Parliament to expedite the process concerning the enactment of this 
important piece of legislation. Parliament should obviously take cognisance of all the 
recommendations of relevant parties and bodies, before finally passing the Draft Bill.   
.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
586   The Alliance (2008) at 7. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In 1990 Sachs587 wrote that- 
‘[T]here is no such thing as a typical South African family, let alone an ideal one.  There 
are too many South African families, constituted and dissolved according to a great 
variety of marriage and divorce systems.  The varied origin of the people who make up 
the population of our country is reflected in the multiplicity of marriage rites.  We have 
marriages based on lobola or bohadi, marriages solemnized in church or temple or 
synagogue or before the imam, and marriages celebrated in civil registries’. 
 
This diversity has been further substantiated and added to by legislation and case law 
since 1990, as set out in this mini-thesis. 
 
Parliament gave full recognition to polygynous marriages through the enactment of 
RCMA.588 For certain purposes recognition has also been given to monogamous and 
polygynous Muslim marriages. However, it is sad that the Constitutional Court in the 
Volks589 case did not urge Parliament to amend MOSSA,590 so as to include the cohabitee 
as a ‘spouse’.  This intervention would have alleviated the plight of women as vulnerable 
and marginalised people. 
 
Currently we are on the brink of having the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill591 passed.  
The sooner Parliament passes this Draft Bill,592 the sooner there will be an end to the 
suffering of women - the most vulnerable members of society, who very often do not 
have an equal chance of choosing the marriage related type of relationship that they may 
wish to enter into. 
 
                                                 
587  Sachs (1990) at 70.   
588  RCMA, 1998. 
589  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
590  MOSSA, 1990. 
591  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
592  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
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Since the decision in the Volks case,593 I have always wondered what the outcome would 
have been had the composition of the Constitutional Court been different from what it 
was at the time.  If the majority of Justices had been females, they could have given 
Parliament a year to amend ISA594 and/or MOSSA,595 similarly to what the Constitutional 
Court had decided in relation to same-sex relationships.  Mrs Robinson might just have 
been entitled to protection under these Acts since she sacrificed her life to a relationship 
which became meaningless upon the death of her partner. 
 
The SALRC must be lauded for drafting the Draft Bill596 to assist cohabitees, irrespective 
whether they find themselves in a registered domestic partnership, or an unregistered 
domestic partnership. 
 
I cannot but urge Parliament to attend to the passing of the Draft Bill597 as soon as 
possible, subject to the constructive recommendations of De Vos, Goldblatt and ‘the 
Alliance’, as set out in Chapter Six. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
593  Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
594  ISA, 1987. 
595  MOSSA, 1990. 
596  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (2008). 
597  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill  (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 91
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Books and Chapters in books 
Basson D South Africa’s Interim Constitution: Text and Notes (1995) Cape Town: Juta 
 
Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004) Cape Town: Juta 
 
Cronjé DSP and Heaton J South African Family Law 2ed (2004) Durban: Butterworth 
 
De Vos P ‘Still out in the cold? The Domestic Partnership Bill and the (non) protection of 
marginalised woman’ in Sloth-Nielsen J and du Toit Z (eds)  Trials and Tribulations, 
Trends and Triumphs Developments in International, African and South African Child 
and Family Law (2001-2008) 2ed (2008) at p134. 
 
Hahlo HR ‘Cohabitation, Concubinage and the Common-Law Marriage’ in Fiat Iustitia: 
Essays in Memory of Oliver Schreiner (1983) Cape Town: Juta  p244 
 
Hahlo HR The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5ed (1985) Cape Town: Juta 
 
Jagwanth S ‘Expanding equality’ in Murray C and O’Sullivan M (eds) Advancing 
Women’s rights (2005) Cape Town: Juta p131 
 
Lind C ‘Domestic partnership and marital status discrimination’ in Murray C and 
O’Sullivan M (eds) Advancing Women’s rights (2005) Cape Town: Juta p108 
 
O’Sullivan M and Murray C ‘Brooms sweeping oceans? Women’s rights in South 
Africa’s first decade of democracy’ in Murray C and O’Sullivan M (eds) Advancing 
Women’s rights (2005) Cape Town: Juta p1 
 
Robinson J et al (eds) Introduction to South African Family Law 4ed (2009) Cape Town: 
Printing Things  
 
 
 
 
 92
Sachs A Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press  
 
Schwellnus T ‘Cohabitation’ (2007) in Schäfer Family Law Service 1 
 
Sinclair J assisted by Heaton J The Law of Marriage (1996) Kenwyn: Juta 
 
Van Heerden B, Cockrell and Keightley R  Boberg’s Law of Persons and the family 2ed 
(1999) Cape Town: Juta 
 
Visser PJ and Potgieter JM   Introduction to Family Law 2ed (1998) Cape Town: Juta 
 
Woolman S ‘Community Rights: Language, Culture & Religion’ in Woolman S, Roux T 
and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2006) Cape Town: Juta p58 
 
Journals  
Bekker JC ‘Interaction between Constitutional Reform and Family Law’ (1991) Acta 
Juridica 1 
 
Bennett TW ‘The equality clause and Customary law’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 122 
 
Bonthuys E ‘The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law’ 
(2002) 119 SALJ  748  
 
Bonthuys E and Pieterse M ‘Still unclear: The validity of certain Customary marriages in 
terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act’ (2000) 63 THRHR 616 
 
Bronstein V ‘Notes and Comments: Confronting Custom in the New South African State: 
An Analysis of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998’ (2000) 16 
SAJHR 558 
 
 
 
 
 
 93
Bronstein V ‘Reconceptualising the Customary Law Debate in South Africa’ (1998) 14 
SAJHR 338 
 
Church J ‘The Dichotomy of Marriage Revisited: A note on Ryland v Edros’ (1997) 60 
THRHR 292 
 
Clark B ‘Families and Domestic Partnerships’ (2002) 119 SALJ 634 
 
Cooke A ‘Choice, heterosexual life partnerships, death and poverty’ (2005) 122 SALJ 
542 
 
Currie I ‘The future of Customary law: lessons from the lobolo debate’ (1994) Acta 
Juridica 146 
 
De Vos P ‘Same-sex sexual desire and re-imagining of the South African family’ (2004) 
20 SAJHR 179 
 
Dlamini CRM ‘The Christian v Customary Marriage Syndrome’ (1985) 102 SALJ  701 
 
Goldblatt B ‘Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening)’ (2000) 1 SAJHR 138 
 
Goldblatt B ‘Regulating domestic partnerships – A necessary step in the development of 
South African Family Law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 610 
 
Hahlo HR ‘The Law of Concubinage’ (1972) 89 SALJ 321. 
 
Hutchings S and Delport, E ‘Cohabitation: a responsible approach’ (1992) 290 De Rebus 
121 
 
 
 
 
 
 94
Kaganas F and Murray C ‘Law, Women and the Family: the Question of Polygyny in a 
new South Africa’ (1991)  Acta Juridica 116 
 
Labuschagne J ’Regsakkulturasie, Lobolo–funksies en die oorsprong van die huwelik’ 
(1991) 54 THRHR 541 
 
Monareng KN ‘Black women, are you aware that you are concubines? The legal 
implications of SA Family Law’ (2007) 71 Agenda 122 
 
Moosa N ‘The Interim and Final Constitutions and Muslim Personal Law: Implications 
for South African Muslim Women’ (1998) 9 Stellenbosch Law Review 196 
 
Moosa N and Karbanee S ‘An exploration of mataa’a maintenance in anticipation of the 
recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa: (Re-)opening a veritable Pandora's 
Box?’ (2004) 8 Law, Democracy, Development 267 
 
Murray C ‘Legal eye: Is Polygyny Wrong’ (1994) 22 Agenda 37 
 
Rautenbach C ‘Gender Equality And Religious Family Laws in South Africa’ (2003) 3 
(1) Queensland University of Technology, Law and Justice Journal 168  
 
Rautenbach C and Du Plessis W ‘The extension of the dependant's action for loss of 
support and the recognition of Muslim marriages: The saga continues’ (2000) 63 THRHR 
302 
 
Robinson K ‘The minority and subordinate status of African women under Customary 
Law’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 457 
 
Singh D ‘Women Know Your Rights: The Recognition of African Customary Marriages 
Act; Traditional Practice and the Right to Equal Treatment’ (1999) De Jure 314 
 
 
 
 
 
 95
Sloth-Nielsen, J and Van Heerden B ‘The Constitutional family: developments in South 
African family law jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution’ (2003) 17(2) International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 121 
 
Snyman-Van Deventer E and Henning JJ ‘Die vennootskap: goeie huweliksmaat met 
huwelik of konkubinaat’ (2003) 28 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 76 
 
Case Law 
Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) 
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) 
Annabhay v Ramlall and Others 1960 (3) SA 802 (D)  
Baadjies v Matubela 2002 (3) SA 427 (W) 
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C) 
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commission for Gender Equality 
as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights 
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) 
Chaplin, N.O. v. Gregory (or Wyld) 1950 (3) SA 555 (C) 
Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2003 (9) BCLR 969 (C) 
Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) 
Daniels v Daniels and the Master CPD 1998-05-10 Case no. 9787/98 (Unreported) 
Drummond v  Drummond 1979 (1) SA 161 (A) 
Ex parte Dessels 1976 (1) SA 851 (D) 
Francis v Dhanai (2006) JOL 18401 (N) 
Gory v Kolver 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) 
Gumede v The President of South Africa 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) 
Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) 
Hassam v Jacobs NO and others [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C) 
Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC)  
Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) 
Kambule v The Master and Others 2007 (3) SA 403 (E) 
 
 
 
 
 96
Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T) 
Kwitshane v Magalela 1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk) 
Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (T) 
Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T) 
Makholiso v Makholiso 1997 (4) SA 509 (Tk) 
Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC) 
Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1997 (2) SA 936 (T) 
Muhlman v Muhlman 1981 (4) SA 632 (W) 
Muhlman v Muhlman 1984 (3) SA 102 (A) 
Owen-Smith v Owen-Smith 1982 (1) SA 511 (ZSC) 
Prior v Battle and Others 1999 (2) SA 850 (Tk) 
Robinson and Another v Volks NO and Others  2004 (6) BCLR 671 (C), 2004 (6) SA 288 
(C) 
Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C), 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) 
Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1968 (1) SA 699 (W) 
Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 
Seemela v Minister of Safety and Security [1998] 1 All SA 408 (W) 
Sepehri v Scanlan 2008  (1) SA  322 (C) 
Sokhewu and another v Minister of Police (2002) JOL 9424 (Tk) 
V. (also known as L.) v. De Wet, N.O. 1953 (1) SA 613 (O) 
Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) 
Wormald NO and Others v Kambule 2006 (3) SA 562 (SCA) 
 
Legislation 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 
Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
 
 
 
 
 97
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 
De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (New South Wales) 
Demobilisation Act 99 of 1996 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
Identification Act 68 of 1997 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 (KwaZulu) 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
Marriage Act 51 of 1961 
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 
New South Wales Property Relationships Act, 1984 (New South Wales) 
Pension Funds Acts 24 of 1956 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 
2009 
Special Pensions Act 69 of 1996 
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 
Transkei Marriage Act 21 of 1978 (Transkei) 
 
Bills 
Civil Union Bill of 2006 
Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008 (Draft) 
Muslim Marriages Bill of 2003 (Draft) 
Internet 
‘Dum Casta Clauses’  
 
 
 
 
 98
http://www.google.co.za/search?hl=en&q=dum+casta+clauses&btnG=Search&meta= 
 
Motala Z ‘The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: An Unwise, 
Improvident and Questionable Constitutional Exercise’ <http:www.al-
inaam.com/misc/mplc 01.htm> accessed on 6 October 2009  
 
‘Muslim Marriage law bid under the spotlight’  Mail & Guardian Online (2009)  
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009 -05-20-muslim - marriage - law - bid - under - spotlight   
 
Other materials 
Goldblatt B ‘Different Routes to Relationship Recognition Reform: A Comparative 
Discussion of South Africa and Australia’ (2008). (Paper presented at the Law and 
Society Australia and New Zealand (LSAANZ) Conference ‘W(h)ither Human Rights’, 
held at the University of Sydney 10-12 December 2008)  
 
Maughan K ‘Muslim Marriages Bill Heading for Cabinet’ (2009) Cape Times of 24 
March at 1  
 
SALC ‘Islamic Marriages and Related Matters’ Project 59 Issue paper 15 (2000) 
 
SALRC ‘Report on Domestic Partnerships’ Project 118 (2006)  
 
The Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships ‘Submission to the 
Department of Home Affairs on the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008’ (2008)  
 
The Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand ‘Submission to 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs: “The Civil Unions Bill 2006”’ 
(2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
